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Abstract
Last February, the International Court of Justice issued a judgement adjudicating claims by
Bosnia and Herzegovina that Serbia breached the 1948 Genocide Convention – the case marks the
first time a state has made such claims against another. The alleged genocidal acts were the same
as those that have been the subject of several criminal trials in the Yugoslav Tribunal. The judg-
ment contained several landmark rulings – among them, the Court found that a state, as a state,
could commit the crime of genocide and the applicable standard of proof for determining state
responsibility is comparable to the standard used in criminal trials. The Court, with these rulings,
committed itself to the same essential task faced by the Yugoslav Tribunal – an examination of
the states of mind of senior officials to determine if genocidal acts were committed with the intent
to destroy a protected group. The work of the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda has
demonstrated that adjudicating genocide cases present several unique interpretative and analytical
challenges. The Court, intended as a forum to resolve disputes between states, is ill-equipped to
adjudicate issues traditionally reserved for criminal courts involving the examination of an indi-
vidual’s state of mind. Further, considerations of fairness prevent the Court from adjudicating the
criminal culpability of individuals who are not before it. This article explores the methodology
developed by the ICJ for adjudicating its first genocide case, its implications for future cases and
draws the conclusion that such methodology forces the Court into a relationship that is dependent
upon the work of other international criminal tribunals.
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Hopefully, the activities of these two judicial institutions of
the United Nations [The International Court of Justice and
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via] ... contribute in their respective fields to their common
objective-the achievement of international justice-however
imperfect it may be perceived.
Judge Peter Tomka, International Court of Justice
INTRODUCTION
On February 26, 2007, the International Court of Justice
("ICJ")' issued its judgment in Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("ICJ Genocide
Judgment"),2 adjudicating claims by Bosnia and Herzegovina
("Bosnia") that Serbia had breached its obligations under the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 1948 ("Genocide Convention"). The case, filed by
Bosnia against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY') in
* Dermot Groome is a Senior Trial Attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor. This
Article was written while he was a visiting professor at Pennsylvania State Dickinson
School of Law. He would like to express his gratitude for the school's support of this
project.
1. The International Court ofJustice ("ICJ") was established by the Charter of the
United Nations ("U.N.") in 1945 as the successor institution to the Permanent Court of
International Justice and is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations. The ICJ
has its own statute and rules and has the authority to give advisory opinions as well as
settle controversial cases between states. By ratifying the U.N. Charter, Member States
consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and have the right to bring disputes with other
states before the ICJ. Some conventions, such as the Genocide Convention, have spe-
cific provisions referring disputes to the ICJ. See Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 9, Dec. 11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinaf-
ter Genocide Convention]; U.N. Charter arts. 92-93; Statute of the International Court
of Justice arts. 1, 36, 65, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
2. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter ICJ Genocide Judgment].
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1993, alleged that the widespread campaign of ethnic cleans-
ing-focused most sharply against the Muslim population of
Bosnia-constituted a breach of Serbia's obligations under the
Genocide Convention.3 The case marks the first time a State
Party to that Convention has accused another state of perpetrat-
ing the crime of genocide. In reexamining old injuries, the ICJ's
judgment renewed controversy between the different ethnic
groups about the continued existence of the joint political insti-
tutions created by the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995.4
The case had a long, complex procedural history compli-
cated by continued conflict in the region and by the question of
Serbia's membership in the United Nations ("U.N.") after the
dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1992-a question that had signifi-
cant jurisdictional implications for the case.5 After determining
3. Prior to its dissolution, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY') was
comprised of six constituent republics: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia. At the time of filing, Bosnia, Slovenia, Croatia, and
Macedonia were recognized as independent countries, and the remaining Yugoslav
states of Serbia and Montenegro were collectively referred to as the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia ("FRY'), having adopted this name in 1992. In 2003, the FRY changed its
name to "Serbia and Montenegro." After a referendum in May 2006, Montenegro dis-
solved its union with Serbia, leaving Serbia as the sole respondent. For the purposes of
the Genocide Convention, Serbia accepted continuity between "Serbia and Montene-
gro" and the "Republic of Serbia." For a full account of the name and identification of
the respondent, see id. 67-79. For clarity, this Article will use the name "Serbia" to
refer to the respondent at all stages of the proceedings.
4. See T.tR Vogel, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Reaching a Breaking Point over Srebrenica, RA-
DIO FREE EUROPE, July 9, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/features/featuresArticle.aspx?m=
07&y-2007&id=B4E3B429-A6CD-486A-ABF9-202B09345A81 ("The most recent cam-
paign to scrap the entities [created by the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995] was
prompted by ajudgment in February, in which the International Court ofJustice (ICJ)
confirmed that the 1995 killings at Srebrenica did in fact constitute genocide.").
5. In its final arguments before the Court, Serbia essentially claimed that the ICJ
had no jurisdiction over it for two reasons: first, because Serbia was not the continuator
state of the SFRY and thus did not "inherit" the SFRYs obligations under the Genocide
Convention, and second, because it was not the continuator of the SFRY, it did not
"inherit" the SFRY's membership in the U.N., and thus was not a party to the ICJ's
statute. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 66. The issue of Serbia's U.N. mem-
bership is complicated because following the dissolution of the SFRY, the FRY (Serbia
and Montenegro) claimed to be the continuator of the SFRY and its membership in the
U.N. On May 30, 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 757, which re-
jected the FRY's claim to be the successor of Yugoslavia as "not be[ing] generally ac-
cepted." S.C. Res. 757, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (May 30, 1992). It further stated in
Resolution 777 that the FRY could not automatically continue the SFRY's membership
and referred the matter to the General Assembly. See S.C. Res. 777, 1, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/777 (Sept. 19, 1992). On September 22, 1992, the General Assembly adopted
resolution 47/1, which affirmed that the FRY did not inherit the SFRY's membership
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that it did indeed have jurisdiction over Serbia, the ICJ went on
to enter findings regarding Bosnia's allegations against Serbia.
In summary, the ICJ found that Serbia, as a state, had neither
committed genocide in Bosnia nor been complicit in the crime
of genocide.6 The ICJ did conclude that Serbia, through its con-
tinued support of Bosnian Serbs in light of the probability that
some of them would commit the crime of genocide, had "vio-
lated the obligation to prevent genocide .. .in respect of the
genocide that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995."' The ICJ
further concluded that Serbia's failure to transfer Ratko Mladit
to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via ("ICTY") was a breach of the Genocide Convention.' The
judgment, which fell far short of the relief sought by Bosnia,9 was
immediately criticized by observers who questioned not only the
ICJ's findings, but its methodology, its analysis, and even the
and that it should "apply for membership in the United Nations." G.A. Res. 47/1, 1,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (Sept. 22, 1992). Serbia, maintaining that it continued the
SFRY's membership, did not reapply for membership until 2000, when Vojislav Kol-
tunica defeated Slobodan Milogevit in the election for presidency of the federation. In
1996, without expressly considering issues related to the FRY's U.N. membership, the
ICJ determined that it did have jurisdiction over the FRY. See Application of the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 609-10, 613 (July 11). In 1999, the FRY initiated an application
before the ICJ alleging that eight Member States of NATO had violated international
law by bombing Serbia that year. In 2004, the ICJ dismissed these claims, stating that
"Serbia and Montenegro was not a Member of the United Nations [in 1999]." Legality
of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), 2004 I.C.J. 279, 311 (Dec. 15). Faced with the
apparent inconsistency of dismissing Serbia's claims against NATO on jurisdictional
grounds and a finding of jurisdiction in the ICJ Genocide Judgment, the ICJ applied
the principle of res judicata to its 1996judgment finding jurisdiction in 1996. For addi-
tional information on the question of Serbia's membership in the United Nations, see
Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the United
Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29, 53 (1995) and Yehuda Z. Blum, UN Membership of the
"New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 830 (1992).
6. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 1 471.
7. See id.
8. See id. The ICJ also found that "Serbia has violated its obligation to comply with
the provisional measures ordered by the Court on 8 April and 13 September 1993 in
this case, inasmuch as it failed to take all measures within its power to prevent genocide
in Srebrenica in July 1995." Id.
9. The Bosnian government sought "full compensation for the damages and losses
caused, in the amount to be determined by the court in a subsequent phase of the
proceedings in this case." Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007), at
294 (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/8616.pdf (last
visited Mar. 20, 2008).
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ICJ's capacity to adjudicate such a complex case.'0
This Article explores the ICJ's methodology and its result-
ing analysis, and interprets both in relation to the parallel work
of the ICTY. While the ICJ is to be commended for its efforts to
give practical effect to the prohibitions of the Genocide Conven-
tion, its methodology and analysis fell short of the task before it,
with the clearest example being its failure to assess, in any com-
prehensive way, the body of evidence that the prosecution intro-
duced in the genocide case against Slobodan Milogevit before
the ICTY. At the end of the prosecution's case, the trial cham-
ber, pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, determined that the prosecution had introduced
sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable trial chamber could
be satisified beyond a reasonable doubt that MilogeviC had com-
mitted the crime of genocide. MilogeviCs death ended the case,
however, and denied the world a definitive, finaljudgment. The
ICJ's failure to examine this body of evidence is tacit recognition
of its inability to take on the role of a trial chamber adjudicating
individual guilt-that is, to carefully explore complex testimony
and evidence, and to make determinations regarding issues of
individual criminal responsibility. This Article argues that the
ICJ, through several of its rulings, committed itself to carrying
out some of the same tasks as a criminal tribunal but that the ICJ
was unable to independently complete the very task that it de-
fined for itself. Instead, it has created a relationship of depen-
dency-a relationship in which it will always have to wait upon,
and defer to, international criminal tribunals adjudicating geno-
cide cases before it can properly enter a judgment regarding
state responsibility for the crime of genocide.
While the term "genocide" became part of the world's vo-
10. See Ruth Wedgwood, Op-Ed., Bad Day for International Justice, INT'L HERALD
TmRB., Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2OO7/O3/O8/opinion/
edwedge.php ("Yet the International Court of Justice . . . fail[s] to explain why the
deliberate slaughter of civilians in the riverside town of Brcko in 1992, meant to push
Muslims away from the Sava River corridor or the torture and starvation of Muslim
civilians in Foca, is different in kind from the Srebrenica murders meant to secure the
Drina Valley .... It will take years of study to understand how that could be true ....
[T]he International Court of Justice applies the demands of criminal proof to a civil
case. Thejudges insist that even for civil liability, proof against Belgrade has to be 'fully
conclusive' and 'incontrovertible,' with a level of certainty 'beyond any doubt.' This
standard is well known when the jail door will shut, but it exceeds the demands of civil
liability.").
ADJUDICATING GENOCIDE
cabulary during the Nazi campaign against six million Jews in
World War II, it was only after the war that genocide became a
legally enforceable crime. Targeting an entire group of people
for destruction was recognized as being qualitatively different
from the particular acts, all crimes in themselves, used to achieve
that end. Although the crime of persecution covered acts that
we now consider genocide, such a characterization did not ade-
quately reflect the magnitude or unique character of this "crime
of all crimes."'" Raphael Lemkin fashioned the term "genocide"
and indefatigably campaigned for its recognition as a distinct
crime. 2 On December 11, 1946, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted a resolution defining genocide as "a denial of the right
of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of
the right to live of individual human beings."1 Two years later,
the Genocide Convention was adopted, unequivocally establish-
ing genocide as an international crime and giving it a precise
legal definition capable of enforcement. The crime of genocide
would move from page to praxis when the ICTY and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") incorporated, al-
most verbatim, the definitional provisions of the Genocide Con-
vention into their respective statutes and applied them to the
unbridled inhumanity that scourged Rwanda and the former Yu-
goslavia in the early 1990s. Trials in the two ad hoc tribunals
have now forged a body of nascent jurisprudence that has given
tangible form and effect to Lemkin's quest to hold those who
commit genocide individually responsible for their acts.1 4
In 1993, while the U.N. Security Council was considering
taking the bold step of establishing an ad hoc tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,' 5 Bos-
nia initiated ICJ proceedings against the FRY, alleging that the
FRY had perpetrated, and was continuing to perpetrate, the
11. GU9NA.L ME'TTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS 199
(2005).
12. See RAPHAL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION,
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (1973).
13. G.A. Res. 96/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/96/1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
14. Ralph Lemkin was a Holocaust survivor who coined the term "genocide" and
was a tenacious advocate for its formal recognition as a distinct international crime. See
LEMKIN, supra note 12, at 91.
15. See S.C. Res. 808, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 827,
pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). Bosnia instituted proceedings against
Serbia on March 20, 1993. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 1.
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crime of genocide against the non-Serb population of Bosnia. 6
Within months the ICTY was established in the Hague, a short
distance away from the ICJ; the two international courts would
begin their parallel, yet distinct, efforts to give effect to the
prohibitions embodied in the Genocide Convention. These re-
lated endeavors, in which the two courts would seek to deter-
mine both state and individual responsibility for crimes commit-
ted in Bosnia, would require the courts to interpret the language
of the Genocide Convention and to develop standards and
methodologies suitable to the task of applying it.
In the ICJ Genocide Judgment the ICJ explicitly recognized
that it was treading the same ground as ICTYjudges, which was
described as an "unusual" feature of the case.1 7 But in coming
years, this situation is apt to become the norm. As our system of
international criminal justice leaves its adolescence and matures
into an effective and predictable check on impunity (primarily
through the International Criminal Court ("ICC")), it is likely
that all credible allegations of genocide will be the subject of
comprehensive investigations to determine individual responsi-
bility. It seems equally likely that other countries will follow Bos-
nia's initiative and call upon the ICJ to intervene and adjudicate
interstate violations of the Genocide Convention. 8 In such cir-
cumstances, the parallel cases before the ICJ will most likely be
commenced during the course of continuing criminal activity
and before individual criminal accountability has authoritatively
been determined in an international criminal tribunal. The re-
sulting overlap in the work of the two international courts in-
volved has the potential either to facilitate or to impede their
work. 9 One ICJ judge expressed the view, however, that it may
16. Bosnia sought to define the targeted group in negative terms: "non-Serb na-
tional, ethnical or religious group within, but not limited to, the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including in particular the Muslim population." See ICJ Genocide Judg-
ment, supra note 2, 66.
17. See id. 212.
18. After Bosnia filed its application in the ICJ, Croatia filed a similar application
against Serbia, claiming that Serbia had breached the Genocide Convention with re-
spect to crimes committed within the borders of Croatia. See id. 232; see also Press
Release, International Court of Justice, Croatia Institutes Proceedings Against Yugosla-
via for Violations of the Genocide Convention, Press Release 1999/38 (July 2, 1999)
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=527&pt=I&pl= 6 &p 2 =l.
19. Judge Tomka, in concluding his separate opinion, stated: "This Court and the
ICTY have two different missions but one common objective .... The activity of the
[ICJ] has thus complemented the judicial activity of the ICTY in fulfilling the Court's
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be impossible for the ICJ to adjudicate state-versus-state claims
alleging genocide absent a parallel international court.2°
I. GENOCIDE: ADJUDICATING THE CRIME OF CRIMES
The definitional element that most distinguishes genocide
from other international crimes is its mens rea requirement that
the perpetrator have the "intent to destroy in whole or in part a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such,"21 com-
monly referred to as the "special intent," or "dolus specialis," of
genocide. Although the term "genocide" is popularly used to
describe serious crimes committed on a discriminatory basis, its
legal definition limits its prohibition to specified acts committed
with the intent to destroy a particular protected group. The con-
role in the field of State responsibility for genocide, over which the ICTY has no juris-
diction. Hopefully, the activities of these two judicial institutions of the United Nations,
the Court remaining the principal judicial organ of the Organization, contribute in
their respective fields to their common objective-the achievement of international jus-
tice-however imperfect it may be perceived." Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.)
(Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007) (Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka), 73, available at
http://www.icj-cj.org/docket/files/91/13699.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter ICJ Genocide Judgment (Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka)].
20. See id. 72 ("Cases involving the 'responsibility of a State for genocide' are too
serious to be adjudicated simply on the basis of the allegations by the Parties."). Judge
Tomka also recognized that "[w]ithout the work accomplished by the ICTY, it would
have been much more difficult for the Court to discharge its role in the present case."
Id.
21. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 2. The full text of Article 2 of the
Genocide Convention reads as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts commit-
ted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. This language was incorporated without significant alteration into the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") Statute, the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") Statute, and the Rome Statute creating the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia art. 4, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute
of The International Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598; Rome
Statute of The International Criminal Court art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. See generally M. CHERIF BAsSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 138 (2003) (identifying other instruments defining genocide).
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sequence of this requirement is that large-scale, grievous crimes
committed on a discriminatory basis are not genocide unless it
can be demonstrated that its perpetrators possessed the dolus
specialis to destroy a protected group.2 2 This unique mens rea
imposes an additional and heavy burden of proof upon the party
claiming that particular crimes constitute genocide.
Genocide's elusive dolus specialis, coupled with a paucity of
cases from which to take guidance, makes the crime difficult to
investigate and adjudicate.23 This notion of intent has presented
an interpretive challenge for ICTYjudges. In many cases the ac-
tus reus of genocide may be virtually indistinguishable from the
actus reus of other serious international crimes, such as some
forms of persecution as a crime against humanity. 24 Indeed, at
the time of Nuremberg, the conduct prohibited by the Genocide
Convention actually fell conceptually within the crime of perse-
cution as a crime against humanity.25 Although judges do, as a
22. On September 4, 2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, appearing before
the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared: "I concluded .. . that geno-
cide has been committed in Darfur. .. ." Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls
Killings in Sudan Genocide; Khartoum and Arab Militias Are Responsible, Powell Says, WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at Al. Compare this with the conclusion of the commission ap-
pointed by the U.N. Secretary-General, chaired by Antonio Cassesse, which found that
while grave crimes (including killing, rape, and forced displacement) were committed
by government forces, it could not be established that those actions constituted geno-
cide.
[T]he crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far
as the central Government authorities are concerned. Generally speaking the
policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes
does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group
distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather, it would
seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the
intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of
counter-insurgency warfare.
The Secretary-General, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the
Secretary-General, at 4, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25,
2005).
23. See STEVEN R. RATNER &JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HuMt'N RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 34 (1997).
24. In theory and in practice, there is little distinction between the actus reus of
the crime of genocide and the most serious forms of persecution as a crime against
humanity. In fact, there is no case in the ICTY or the ICTR in which genocide has been
charged to the exclusion of the crime of persecution. Given the similarity of the under-
lying conduct and the inherently difficult burden of establishing genocide, prosecutors
have exercised their charging discretion cautiously to couple the charge of persecution
as a crime against humanity with genocide.
25. See Antonio Cassesse, Genocide, in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
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matter of routine, draw logical and necessary inferences from
the conduct of persons on trial, the conduct underlying gen-
ocide and other serious crimes are so similar as to present ser-
ious analytical difficulties. Of special note in this context is the
determination whether a discriminatory crime was perpetrated
against victims because of their membership in a group or was
also intended as part of an effort to destroy the group itself.2 6
Discerning such genocidal intent has been one of the greatest
challenges faced by judges of the ad hoc tribunals.2 7
The difficulties in establishing genocide are further compli-
cated by the collective nature of the crime.2" Historical manifes-
tations of genocide have always involved large numbers of actors,
with each contributing in varying degrees to the harm to the
29targeted group. In a crime that necessarily involves the actions
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 335, 335 (Antonio Cassesse, Paola Gaeta & John
R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
26. With persecution, as with all crimes against humanity, the prosecution must
establish that the defendant was aware that his particular crime was part of a broader
criminal event-"a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian popula-
tion." Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 7. There is no burden that the actor intend any
particular consequence on the targeted group as a group. See Prosecutor v. Blagki ,
Case No. IT-94-14-T, Judgment, 1 207 (Mar. 3, 2000).
27. Consider the Jelisie case:
From this point of view, genocide is closely related to the crime of persecu-
tion, one of the forms of crimes against humanity set forth in Article 5 of the
Statute. The analyses of the Appeals Chamber and the Trial Chamber in the
Tadie case point out that the perpetrator of a crime of persecution, which
covers bodily harm including murder, also chooses his victims because they
belong to a specific human group. As previously recognised by an Israeli Dis-
trict Court in the Eichmann case and the Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the
Kayishema case, a crime characterised as genocide constitutes, of itself, crimes
against humanity within the meaning of persecution.
Prosecutor v. Jelisit, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 1 68 (Dec. 14, 1999) (footnotes
omitted); see also GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 254-55
(2005).
28. A report published by the Bosnian Serb government acting under pressure
from the international community estimated that over 19,000 people participated in
the massacres perpetrated in Srebrenica. See Nicholas Wood, More Prosecutions Likely to
Stem from New Srebrenica Report, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A15. The government con-
ceded that it still employed approximately 900 of the named participants. See id.
29. See LEMKIN, supra note 12, at 79 ("[G]enocide ... is intended ... to signify a
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations
of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The
objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions,
of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national
groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even
lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.").
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and intentions of many individuals, it may be difficult to deter-
mine whose state of mind (in addition to that of the accused) is
relevant to the inquiry.30 In complex criminal acts that are the
culmination of a multitude of persons, genocidal intent may be
found in an equivalent multitude of places. 1 While the simplest
formulation would be characterized by senior state officials and
every person contributing to the actus reus sharing the same
genocidal intent, that is not the reality of this complex crime. It
may be that the direct perpetrators harbor genocidal intent,
whereas state officials do not. Conversely, the state's senior lead-
ers may be the architects of a carefully calculated genocidal plan
that employs a multitude of others as instrumentalities who
themselves do not possess genocidal intent.3 2 For example, lead-
ers may exploit nationalism to foment fear, causing an explosion
of violence directed at the protected group but whose direct per-
petrators lack the dolus specialis of genocide and are motivated by
a misperceived need for self-defense. These leaders may, with
genocidal intent, be relying on the traditional discipline of
soldiers to gain their participation in an actus reus for which the
soldiers themselves have no relevant dolus specialis.
30. The Krstid appeals chamber found that it could make a determination that
genocidal intent was present despite a failure to identify those who harbored it. See
Prosecutor v. Krstit, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 34 (Apr. 19, 2004). Contrast this
finding with the Staki( trial chamber, which expressed its unwillingness to conclude that
Stakit shared in the genocidal intent of his political superiors without more evidence
about their intent.
Having heard all the evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that it has not been
provided with the necessary insight into the state of mind of alleged perpetra-
tors acting on a higher level in the political structure than Dr. Stakie to enable
it to draw the inference that those perpetrators had the specific genocidal
intent. As a consequence, the Trial Chamber is unable to draw any inference
from the vertical structure that Dr. Stakit shared the intent.
Prosecutor v. Stakie, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, 547 (July 31, 2003).
31. See ME1rRAUX, supra note 11, at 207 ("Thus, genocide, it is sometimes sug-
gested, may only be committed by people holding high offices such as ministers or
generals .... In fact, just as anyone may commit a crime against humanity, all other
conditions being met, anyone can commit a genocidal offence . (footnotes omit-
ted)).
32. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007)
(Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh), 1 48, available at http://www.icj-
cj.org/docket/files/91/13689.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2008) [hereinafter ICJ Geno-
cide Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh)] ("[G]enocide is
definitionally a complex crime in the sense that unlike homicide it takes time to
achieve, requires repetitiveness, and is committed by many persons and organs acting
in concert.").
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The complexity of these questions regarding genocidal in-
tent, which the ICTY and ICTR often faced, was compounded by
the particular setting of the ICJ Genocide Judgment. As a prelimi-
nary matter, the ICJ had to determine whether the Genocide
Convention created not only individual, but also state, criminal
responsibility. Despite the lack of an express provision in the
Genocide Convention prohibiting states from committing geno-
cide, the ICJ came to the conclusion that such a prohibition was
implicit in the Genocide Convention's categorization of geno-
cide as an international crime and that states, by agreeing to
such a categorization, "must logically be undertaking not to com-
mit the act so described."33 This interpretation is incongruent,
however, with the Nuremberg principle that "crimes against in-
ternational law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, " "
and several of the judges disagreed with the majority on this
point. From their perspective, a state, as an abstract entity, was
incapable of forming intent and of committing a crime in the
penal sense. 5
33. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 166. The Court was also led to this
conclusion by States Parties' express obligation to prevent the commission of acts of
genocide. "It would be paradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent,
so far as within their power, commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a
certain influence, but were not forbidden to commit such acts through their own or-
gans .... Id. Finally, the Court interpreted the Genocide Convention's jurisdictional
provisions ("including those [disputes] relating to the responsibility of a State for geno-
cide") as providing for state liability for the commission of genocidal acts. See id. 1 169
(quoting Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 9). Severaljudges dissented from this
view. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007)
(joint Declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma), 4, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/91/13695.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2008) [hereinafter ICJ Genocide Judg-
ment (Joint Declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma)] ("[I]f the Convention was in-
tended to establish an obligation of such grave import as one that could entail some
form of criminal responsibility or punishment of a State by an international tribunal
such as this Court for genocide, this would have been expressly stipulated in the Con-
vention, but the Convention did not do so.").
34. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL: NUREMBURG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 223 (1947); see also ICJ
Genocide Judgment (Joint Declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma), supra note 33, 3
("The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention is to prevent and to punish the
crime of genocide, and, reflecting the Nuremberg principles, the Convention is di-
rected against individuals and not the State."); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 26
("Article IV, reflecting the Nuremberg principles, provides for individual responsibility,
including that of government officials, for genocide.").
35. The problem is underscored by Judge Owada, who, in arguing that the Geno-
cide Convention does not provide for State criminal responsibility, stated that "it is
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Nevertheless, having determined that a state, in principle,
could commit the crime of genocide, the ICJ obliged itself to
determine not simply whether Serbia should be responsible for
the conduct of its officials, but whether Serbia as a state pos-
sessed the requisite dolus specialis to commit genocide. Where,
though, is the locus of the state's intent? The International Law
Commission stated:
The State is a real organized entity, a legal person with full
authority to act under international law. But to recognize this
is not to deny the elementary fact that the State cannot act of
itself. An "act of the State" must involve some action or omis-
sion by a human being or group: "States can act only by and
through their agents and representatives."3 6
clear that the Convention has rejected ...an approach to hold the State directly to
account for an international crime of genocide, on the ostensible ground that a State
cannot commit a crime in the penal sense." Application of the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.)
(Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007) (Separate Opinion of Judge Owada), 1 52, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13697.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). See also
the joint declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma:
We entertain more than serious doubts regarding the interpretation given to
the Genocide Convention in the Judgment to the effect that a State can be
held directly to have committed the crime of genocide. . . . As an interna-
tional criminal instrument, the convention envisages the trial and punishment
of individuals for the crime of genocide. It does not impose criminal responsi-
bility on the State as a State. Indeed, it could not have done so at the time it
was adopted given that the notion of crime of State was not part of interna-
tional law and even today general international law does not recognize the
notion of the criminal responsibility of the State.
ICJ Genocide Judgment (Joint Declaration ofJudges Shi and Koroma), supra note 33, 1
1. Judge Skotnikov disagreed with the majority's position that the Genocide Conven-
tion created an affirmative obligation not to commit genocide. He provides three rea-
sons why it cannot: first, there can be no unstated obligations; second, the "unstated
obligation" created by the majority is incompatible with the Convention, which confines
itself to the criminal culpability of individuals; and third, according to general princi-
ples of international law, states cannot commit crimes; the majority's finding that a
state can perpetrate genocide is inconsistent with the Convention in that there is no
form of genocide that is not a crime, and hence the majority in effect "decriminalizes"
the crime of genocide, transforming it into an "internationally wrongful act." See Appli-
cation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007) (Declaration of Judge
Skotnikov), at 4, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13705.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2008) [hereinafter ICJ Genocide Judgment (Declaration of Judge
Skotnikov)]. Judge Skotnikov also saw the majority's finding of state criminal liability as
an unnecessary construction given the principle that a state can be held responsible any
time a wrongful "act is committed by an individual capable of engaging State responsi-
bility." See id. at 4-5.
36. International Law Commission, Apr. 23-June 1, 2001 & July 2-Aug. 10, 2001,
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The corporate state entity possesses no capacity to formu-
late intent itself: its intent is manifest only in the demonstrable
intentions of state actors with the dejure or de facto authority to
engage the state's participation in the crime's actus reus. The
ICJ developed a two-part test for deciding whether the genocidal
acts could be attributed to a state, which indicated, in turn,
where it would look for genocidal intent. The first part of the
test involved determining "whether the acts of genocide.. . were
perpetrated by 'persons or entities' having the status of organs of
the [FRY] . . . under its internal law, as then in force." 7 Using
this test, the ICJ examined the respondent's internal law to de-
termine if any person or entity engaged in genocidal acts had a
legal relationship with the FRY. In the absence of a direct legal
relationship, the ICJ examined whether acts of genocide were
perpetrated by persons or entities under the "effective control"
of the state as that expression was defined in Military and
Paramilitay Activities in and Against Nicaragua."8
Having found that a state qua state can, in principle, commit
the crime of genocide if those whose conduct is attributable to
the state are individually responsible for genocide, the ICJ
started down a path that would inevitably intersect and overlap
with that of the ICTY. The ICJ would immerse itself in the same
challenges faced by ICTY judges. It would need to determine
the existence of dolus specialis in a collectively perpetrated crime
and to distinguish between genocide and persecution as a crime
against humanity.39 In resolving the question of whether Serbia
perpetrated genocide in Bosnia, the ICJ would examine the con-
duct and state of mind of several of those accused before the
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, 77, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (citing German Settlers in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 6, at 22 (Sept. 10)).
37. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 386.
38. "It must however be shown that this 'effective control' was exercised, or that
the State's instructions were given, in respect of each operation in which the alleged
violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons
or groups of persons having committed the violations." Id. 1 400 (relying on the prece-
dent established in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64-65 (June 27)).
39. Discerning whether an act is a crime against humanity or the crime of geno-
cide is important because the ICJ has jurisdiction over cases of genocide but not over
crimes against humanity. Id. 1 277 ("The killings outlined above may amount to war
crimes and crimes against humanity, but the Court has no jurisdiction to determine
whether this is so.").
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ICTY. Most significantly, in reaching its conclusion that Serbia
breached its duty to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica, the ICJ
examined-and attributed to Serbia-MilogeviCs state of mind:
"The FRY leadership, and President Milogevi6 above all, were
fully aware of the climate of deep-seated hatred which reigned
between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims in the Srebrenica
region. "40
Whereas the ICTY's Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence are specifically designed for inquiring into the minds of
individuals, those of the ICJ, designed for a different purpose,
are ill suited for exploring issues of individual criminal culpabil-
ity. As a preliminary matter, and in this methodological void,
the ICJ was confronted with the task of pronouncing on funda-
mental methodological issues such as the applicable standard of
proof, apportionment of the burden of proof, and the types of
evidence that could be properly considered. Since the ICJ real-
ized that its determination of the applicable standards and meth-
ods would affect future genocide cases, it devoted a significant
portion of its judgment to developing these methods. And as
40. Id. 438. Vice President Al-Khasawneh in his dissent also points to Milogevit's
state of mind as critical to the case.
General MladiCs decisive role in the Srebrenica genocide, the close relation-
ship between General Mladi6 and President Milogevi6, the influential part
President Milogevit played in negotiations regarding Srebrenica (both before
and after the genocide), and his own statements as set forth above, each taken
alone, might not amount to proof of President Milogevi s knowledge of the
genocide set to unfold in Srebrenica. Taken together, these facts clearly estab-
lish that Belgrade was, if not fully integrated in, then fully aware of the deci-
sion-making processes regarding Srebrenica .... There can be no doubt that
President Milogevit was fully appraised of General MladiCs (and the Bosnian
Serb army's) activities in Srebrenica throughout the takeover and massacres.
ICJ Genocide Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President A1-Khasawneh), supra
note 32, 51. Judge Keith, also dissenting, found that Serbia was complicit in the
genocide in Srebrenica. He emphasized the centrality of Milogevit's state of mind.
Given President MilogeviCs overall role in the Balkan wars and his knowledge,
his specific relationship with General Mladit, and his involvement in the detail
of the negotiations of 14 and 15 July, by that time he must have known of the
change in plans made by the VRS command on 12 or 13July and consequently
he must have known that they had formed the intent to destroy in part the
protected group. I am convinced that that knowledge of the Respondent is
proved to the necessary standard stated by the Court in its Judgment ....
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007) (Declaration of
Judge Keith), 15, available at http:// vww.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13701.pdf (last
visited Mar. 20, 2008).
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the dissent by the ICJ's vice-president made clear, methodology
was not merely a matter of form but determined, in his view, the
central substantive issues in the case. In Judge Al-Khasawneh's
view, "had the Court followed more appropriate methods for as-
sessing the facts, there would have been, in all probability, posi-
tive findings as to Serbia's international responsibility."4 More-
over, the flawed methodology adopted by the majority had a
"profound" effect on the majority's ability to understand and ap-
preciate the evidence before it.42 Given this context, my goal
here is to explore the difficulties in adjudicating genocide cases
and how the standards and methodology developed by the ICJ
help define its relationship with the ICTY and with other inter-
national courts that may consider individual and state responsi-
bility for genocide in the future. I will also consider how, in the
future, such courts might better integrate their efforts to hold
individuals and states qua states responsible for acts of genocide.
Their respective methodologies must enable a court not only to
adjudicate the specific claim before it, but to take into account,
as necessary, the existence of a similar inquiry by another inter-
national court.
II. DEFINING THE METHODOLOGY
Historically, the issues raised by the ICJ's judgments have
typically been fairly narrow and confined to a limited set of dis-
puted facts. By contrast, the allegations against Serbia raised
many contentious factual issues. In its effort to address the asso-
ciated methodological complexities, the ICJ separated out three
41. ICJ GenocideJudgment (Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh),
supra note 32, 62. More specifically, Vice President A1-Khasawneh argued that:
[T]he charge that genocide took place also in other parts of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and that the FRY was responsible not only for its failure to prevent
genocide but for being actively involved in it either as a principal or alterna-
tively as an accomplice or by way of conspiracy or incitement would in all
probability have been proved had the Court not adopted the methodology
discussed below.
Id. 1 31.
42. According to Vice President A1-Khasawneh:
Such involvement is supported, in my opinion, by massive and compelling evi-
dence. My disagreement with the majority, however, relates not only to their
conclusions but also to the very assumptions on which their reasoning is based
and to their methodology for appreciating the facts and drawing inferences
therefrom and is hence profound.
Id. 3.
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categories of problems: burden of proof, standard of proof, and
the types of admissible evidence.43
A. Burden of Proof
In apportioning the burden of proof, the ICJ reaffirmed its
general rule that the applicant bears the burden of proof for
establishing its case and that a party asserting a particular fact
bears the burden of establishing that fact." Bosnia generally ac-
cepted this rule and provided the ICJ with a large volume of evi-
dence in support of its claims. Bosnia also argued, however, for
a variation of this general rule, especially given that the respon-
dent had exclusive possession of highly probative evidence. Bos-
nia took the position that Serbia's refusal to produce unredacted
copies of documents requested by Bosnia should have shifted
the onus of proof to Serbia on several key issues.4 5 In particular,
the documents in question were from the FRY's Supreme De-
fence Council ("SDC"), the highest political body with de jure
authority over the Yugoslav army. It met regularly during the
course of the conflict and was comprised of the presidents of
Yugoslavia (Zoran Lili), Montenegro (Momir Bulatovit), and
Serbia (Milogevi6).46 Minutes of the meetings were maintained,
and the discussions between its members were stenographically
recorded.
The SDC minutes appear on their face to be of the type of
evidence that the ICJ has traditionally favored. In Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ stated that " [i] t will prefer
contemporaneous evidence from persons with direct knowledge.
It will give particular attention to reliable evidence acknowledg-
ing facts or conduct unfavourable to the State ....",4 The SDC
43. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 203. The ICJ noted that despite
increasing agreement between the parties, many of the allegations remained contested.
See id. 202.
44. See id. 204 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 437 (Nov. 26)).
45. See id.
46. The Supreme Defence Council ("SDC") was the highest political body of the
FRY having ultimate authority over the country's military personnel and resources. The
council met regularly. The chief of the general staff, Momilo Perigit, regularly re-
ported on the activities of the military, and the council voted on many significant issues
related to the military, including the promotion of officers and the use of military re-
sources. The documents included verbatim transcripts of the meetings as well as min-
utes summarizing the issues they considered and the actions they took.
47. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda)
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documents contained not only a contemporaneous account of
discussions among the most senior political figures, but also, as
suggested by Bosnia's representatives, information unfavorable
to the Serb position before the ICJ. According to the ICJ's test
for attributability, the SDC was the type of de jure state organ
whose conduct and intent could be attributed to Serbia. Al-
though the SDC documents were taken into evidence by the trial
chamber in the ICTY case against Milogevie, they were not made
public. Nevertheless, some of the witness testimony provided in-
dications of what those documents contained. For example, the
trial chamber, in rendering its decision on a motion for ajudg-
ment of acquittal, made several references to the SDC, indicat-
ing the documents' relevance to the charge of genocide against
Milogevid.48 The chamber mentioned LiliC's testimony that the
SDC formalized the payment of all officers in the Bosnian Serb
army in November 1993.4" The chamber also mentioned evi-
dence that the Yugoslav army and the Serb leadership received
operational reports from the Bosnian Serb army;50 that in some
military documents the Bosnian Serb army and the Yugoslav
army were referred to as "one army;"51 and that General Perigit,
chief of the general staff of the Yugoslav army, regularly gave
reports on the army's activities to SDC members.1
2
Bosnia, recognizing the relevance of these documents in the
Milogevit trial, sought their admission in the proceedings before
the ICJ. Bosnia argued that these documents provided contem-
(Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005), 61, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
116/10455.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
48. The Milogevie trial chamber, while compelling production of the SDC minutes,
granted protective measures requested by Serbia that they not be made public. In light
of this decision, the Miloevie trial chamber did not refer directly to the SDC minutes
but instead referred to evidence given publicly about them by other witnesses.
1 49. See Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion forJudg-
ment of Acquittal, 1 260 (June 16, 2004); see also Merdijana Sadovit, Could Key Records
Have Altered ICJRuling?, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, Mar. 9, 2007, http://www.
iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o=333964&apcstate=hsritri200703 (stating that "[t]estimonies of
some witnesses at Milosevic's trial-including former Yugoslav president Zoran Lilic-
suggested the SDC records would have been very valuable for Bosnia's case. Lilic said
the SDC decided in 1993 to formalise support for officers of the Bosnian Serb Army,
VRS by establishing a body within the Yugoslav army called Personnel Centre 30.").
50. See Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion forJudg-
ment of Acquittal, 258 Uune 16, 2004) (citing the testimony of General Wesley
Clark).
51. See id. 273.
52. See id. 1 260.
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poraneous evidence of the thinking of FRY's most senior leaders,
which was of "direct relevance to winning or losing the present
case." 53 Serbia resisted, however, and provided only those por-
tions of the documents that Serbia's co-agent claimed had not
been "classified" by the SDC and the Council of Ministers of Ser-
bia and Montenegro as "a matter of national security interest. 54
In the face of Serbia's steadfast refusal to produce the docu-
ments, Bosnia requested that the ICJ exercise its authority under
Article 49 of the ICJ's Statute and order production of the un-
redacted versions of the SDC documents, 55 but the ICJ declined
to do so.
Though the ICJ could have ordered that the documents be
produced, it has no authority per se to physically compel such
production. Its only recourse is to formally take into considera-
tion the refusal as provided for in Article 49 of the ICJ's Stat-
ute.5 6 For example, in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case between
the United Kingdom and France involving competing claims of
sovereignty over a group of islets and rocks in the Minquiers and
Ecrehos group (off the coast of Jersey), the United Kingdom
sought to rely on a judgment from the Royal Court of Jersey,
issued in 1692. However, in view of the United Kingdom's in-
ability to produce the judgment, the ICJ stated that "[a]s these
documents are not produced, it cannot be seen on what ground
the Judgment was based. It is therefore not possible to draw
from this Judgment any conclusion supporting the British claim
53. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 205.
54. Id.
55. According to Bosnia's deputy agent:
Serbia and Montenegro should not be allowed to respond to our quoting the
redacted SDC reports if it does not provide at the very same time the Appli-
cant and the Court with copies of entirely unredacted versions of all the SDC
shorthand records and of all of the minutes of the same. Otherwise, Serbia
and Montenegro would have an overriding advantage over Bosnia and Herze-
govina with respect to documents, which are apparently, and not in the last
place in the Respondent's eyes, of direct relevance to winning or losing the
present case. We explicitly, Madam President, request the Court to instruct
the Respondent accordingly.
Id. According to Article 49 of the ICJ's Statute, "[t]he Court may, even before the
hearing begins, call upon the agents to produce any document or to supply any expla-
nations. Formal note shall be taken of any refusal." ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art. 49.
56. See GERALD FITZMAURICE, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OFJUSTICE 576-77 (1986); see also Keith Highet, Evidence and Proof of Facts, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 355, 364 (Lori Damrosch ed., 1987).
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to the Minquiers."57 In rendering its decision the ICJ formally
noted that the document was not produced, and declined to
adopt the British agent's unsupported assertion. 8 In Corfu
Channel, the United Kingdom sought to establish facts supported
by a document (referred to as "XCU") that it refused to pro-
duce, claiming that it contained naval secrets. The ICJ declined
to draw any negative inference from the British agent's refusal to
obey the ICJ's Article 49 order to produce the document, even
though the document might have been inconsistent with other
evidence before the ICJ.59 While in neither case was the applica-
tion of Article 49 determinative of the central legal or factual
issues, in both cases it did affect the methodology employed by
the ICJ. 60
The ICJ, in declining to order production of the documents
in the ICJ Genocide Judgment proceedings, observed that Bosnia
had made "ample use of" extensive documentation it received
from the ICTY.6' The ICJ stated that "[a] lthough the Court has
not agreed to either of the Applicant's requests to be provided
with unedited copies of the documents, it has not failed to note
the Applicant's suggestion that the Court may be free to draw its
own conclusions."62 If the ICJ had drawn a negative inference
from Serbia's failure to produce the SDC minutes, the burden of
proof would have shifted to Serbia (at least in some way) to dis-
57. Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 68 (Nov. 17).
58. See id. at 68-69.
59. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Apr. 9) ("The Court
cannot, however, draw from this refusal to produce the orders any conclusions differing
from those to which the actual events gave rise.").
60. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 88 (1958) ("Although the injurious act neither involved prima
facie the liability of the State nor shifted the burden of proof, the fact of the exclusive
control of the State over its territory and the resulting frequent inability of the injured
State to furnish direct proof, had a bearing upon the methods of proof.")
61. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 206. The ICJ's imprecise reference
to other material suggests that it considered the inferences it could draw from the other
material to be a suitable alternative to the SDC documents (which included verbatim
accounts of those vested with the ultimate state authority over Serbia's involvement in
events in Bosnia).
62. Id. "Formal note shall be taken of any refusal" in Article 49 suggests that there
may be some negative inference drawn from a State Party's refusal to produce-but in
this case, having never formally called upon Serbia to produce these documents, the
ICJ could not take such formal note and instead limited itself to taking formal note of
Bosnia's request for the documents, an action the Vice-President's dissent states fails to
meet the requirements of Article 49. See ICJ Genocide Judgment (Dissenting Opinion
of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh), supra note 32, 1 35.
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prove that unfavorable inference.6" The majority's opinion
never states precisely how it takes into account Serbia's refusal to
produce the SDC minutes. Judge AI-Khasawneh's dissent points
out that "no conclusions whatsoever were drawn from noting the
Respondent's refusal to divulge the contents of the unedited
documents."64 He went on to express his view that " [i] t is a rea-
sonable expectation that those documents would have shed light
on the central questions of intent and attributability 65 and that
the ICJ, under Article 49, should either have shifted the burden
of production to Serbia on issues related to the SDC or have
permitted a more liberal use of inference when considering what
the redacted portions might have revealed.66
Bosnia's "ample use" of other ICTY evidence did not dimin-
ish the importance of the SDC documents-the SDC documents
would not have been cumulative of other evidence but consti-
tuted an independent source of probative evidence. As the ICJ
noted early in its opinion, the central issues of the ICJ Genocide
Judgment had not yet been the subject of an ICTYjudgment. 67
All of the ICTYjudgments available to Bosnia examined the re-
sponsibility of Bosnian Serbs; those cases sought to establish,
within the strict constraints of a criminal trial of individual re-
sponsibility, whether those particular individuals were responsi-
63. For a general explanation of how drawing inferences shifts the burden of
proof before international courts, see MOJTABA KAzAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED
ISSUES: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 259-74 (1996).
64. ICJ Genocide Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President A1-Khasawneh),
supra note 32, 35.
65. Id.
66. See id. ("It would normally be expected that the consequences of the note
taken by the Court would be to shift the onus probandi or to allow a more liberal re-
course to inference as the Court's past practice and considerations of common sense
and fairness would all demand. This was expressed very clearly by the Court in its Corfu
Channel Judgment: 'On the other hand the fact of this exclusive territorial control
exercised by a State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the methods of proof availa-
ble to establish the knowledge of that State as to such events. By reason of this exclusive
control, the other State, the victim of a breach of international law, is often unable to
furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility. Such a State should be allowed
a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.'"); see also
SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-1996, at
1362 (1997) ("A formal instance of the invocation of Article 49 is found in the letter of
4 October 1951 to the French agent in the U.S. Nationals in Morocco case concerning the
capacity in which the proceedings had been instituted. In the Monetary Gold case, the
Court relied upon Article 49 in making its interlocutory order in connection with the
preliminary question." (footnotes omitted)).
67. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 1 206.
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ble for the crimes with which they were charged. None of those
judgments addressed the individual responsibility of senior Yu-
goslav leaders such as Milogevi6, Perigit, Bulatovie, or Lili. 6s
The first trial to comprehensively examine issues directly ger-
mane to the ICJ inquiry was the Miloevi case. The Miloevie trial
chamber ultimately found in its 98 bis Decision that a reasonable
trier of fact could conclude from the prosecution evidence (in-
cluding the SDC documents) that Milogevi6, president of Serbia
and an SDC member, was a participant in a joint criminal enter-
prise with Bosnian Serb leadership and that "he shared with its
participants the aim and intention to destroy a part of the Bos-
nian Muslims as a group."6" It is likely that the ICJ would have
relied on the SDC documents had those been made public in
the Milo~evi case. The ICJ's reluctance to infringe on Serbia's
sovereignty by requiring it to produce the documents, or, in the
alternative, to draw a negative inference from its failure to pro-
duce them, impugns the ICJ's judgment and encourages specu-
lation that the ICJ may have decided the case differently had it
considered the SDC documents.
The ICJ compounded this error by drawing inferences from
the absence of evidence that it likely would have had before it if
Serbia produced the unredacted SDC documents. Without the
benefit of the SDC documents, which were directly related to the
culpability of senior Serbian officials for crimes in Bosnia, the
ICJ drew speculative inferences from the absence of evidence in
other ICTY trials, which did not. The clearest example relates to
Srebrenica and the ICJ's drawing of negative inferences from the
lack of evidence concerning some factual issues pertaining to
Serb involvement. While the issue of who may have given orders
to the persons convicted of crimes in Srebrenica was relevant to
the ICJ inquiry, it was not directly relevant in the Srebrenica tri-
als the ICJ relied upon. The ICJ mistakenly assumed that if there
were evidence of involvement by senior Serb officials, it would
have been introduced in the several Srebrenica trials. On one
68. The only decision to consider the relationship of Yugoslavia to the events in
Bosnia was the Tadie Jurisdictional Appeal, which considered whether the conflict was
of an international character.
69. See Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion forJudg-
ment of Acquittal, 288 (June 16, 2004). Judge Kwon dissented from this finding,
although he did agree with the majority that genocide was a foreseeable consequence
of the joint criminal enterprise.
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particularly important point, the ICJ drew the conclusion that
"no evidence has been presented" that General MladiC or other
officers from the 30th Personnel Centre were "officers of the
army of the Respondent .... In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, those officers must be taken to have received their or-
ders from the Republika Srpska or the VRS, not from the FRY."7
In light of its decision not to order production of evidence that
could have answered this question concerning FRY involvement,
the ICJ's drawing an inference from the absence of evidence em-
phasizes the relationship between its apportionment of the bur-
den of proof and the ultimate outcome in the ICJ Genocide Judg-
ment.
B. Standard of Proof
One of the issues the ICJ faced was the quantum of proof
required before it could enter ajudgement in favor of the appli-
cant. Bosnia suggested that the standard of proof be a "balance
of probabilities."7" Serbia asserted that given the seriousness of
the allegations, "a charge of such exceptional gravity against a
State requires a proper degree of certainty. The proofs should
be such as to leave no room for reasonable doubt."72 While Bos-
nia advocated for a standard commonly used to assess nonpenal
civil responsibility for damages, Serbia claimed that the same
standard of proof ordinarily applied in criminal trials was the
most appropriate standard. The evidentiary gap that lies be-
tween these two standards is wide, making the ICJ's choice of
which standard to apply one of the key factors determining the
outcome of the case.7 3
The ICJ opted for the higher standard of proof, referring to
Corfu Channel, a 1949 case in which the United Kingdom sought
relief against Albania when mines in the Corfu Strait detonated,
damaging naval ships and killing dozens of sailors.
The Court has long recognized that claims against a State in-
volving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evi-
dence that is fully conclusive .... The Court requires that it
70. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 388.
71. Id. 1 208.
72. Id.
73. Given the significant strategic implications that the standard of proof has on
how a party prepares and presents its case, deferring a decision on the applicable stan-
dard until the final judgment raises issues of fairness.
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be fully convinced that allegations made in the proceedings,
that the crime of genocide . . . [has] been committed ....
The same standard applies to the proof of attribution for
such acts.
7 4
Using a standard of proof equivalent to that of a criminal trial is
logically consistent with the ICJ's understanding of its own
task-to determine whether Serbia, as a state, had perpetrated
the crime of genocide. A lesser burden of proof would have
been at variance with its jurisprudence and incongruent with
traditional standards of establishing criminal culpability. In the
context of Bosnia's claims, the coupling of this high standard of
proof with genocide's inexorable requirement of dolus specialis
imposed a heavy burden on Bosnia to establish the individual
criminal responsibility of actors (a task similar to that of the
ICTY prosecutor seeking to establish individual responsibility)
and to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that their actions
were attributable to Serbia. This standard of proof has been crit-
icized. Some scholars have argued that since the remedy did not
include incarceration, but only declaratory and compensatory
relief, the standard of proof should have been a simple balance
of probabilities, or, in any event, one that was lower than that
traditionally required for individual crimes.75
From a practical perspective, in view of the similarity be-
tween the ICJ's factual inquiries and those in several parallel
ICTY cases, adopting a different standard of proof would not
have been feasible. Although using a lower standard of proof
would have allowed the ICJ to recognize and adopt findings of
ICTYjudges, it would have put the ICJ in the position of con-
ducting detailed reexamination of trial evidence whenever ICTY
judges determined that the prosecution had failed to establish a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ICTYjudgments resulting in
acquittals for genocide (or other crimes that could constitute
the actus reus of genocide) leave open the possibility that evi-
dence that fell below the threshold of "proof beyond reasonable
doubt" would nevertheless satisfy the lower standard of "balance
of probabilities." The ICJ, faced with this possibility, would have
had to reexamine the relevant evidence in those trials and make
74. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 209. Later in the opinion, the ICJ
stated that "it is not established beyond any doubt in the argument between the Parties
whether the authorities of the FRY.. . ." Id. 422.
75. See Wedgwood, supra note 10.
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its own assessments regarding credibility and reliability-ajuridi-
cal task fraught with risk of inaccuracy and error, especially
when evaluating witness testimony without the benefit of seeing
the witness or having the opportunity to ask questions.
While an equivalent standard of proof between the two
courts thus appears desirable, the application of such a stan-
dard-namely, beyond a reasonable doubt-presents its own set
of difficulties. These difficulties raise the central question of
whether the ICJ is capable of determining that the crime of ge-
nocide has been committed. Given a standard of proof
equivalent to that of a criminal trial for an inquiry that obliges
the ICJ to examine the states of minds of individuals not before
it, one wonders how an applicant could ever meet that burden.
While the Miloevie trial has been widely criticized as taking too
long, there have been no viable alternative procedures put for-
ward that would more efficiently adjudicate such weighty matters
to the appropriate standard of proof while observing the proce-
dural protections required for a fair trial. Most ICTY trials, even
those considered more efficiently run than the Milo~evi6 trial,
took over a year to complete, even though the trial chamber was
exclusively engaged in that matter. The structure of the ICJ, with
its fifteen judges hearing every case that comes before it, lacks
the practical capacity to engage in the detailed inquiries of the
ICTY's three-judge trial chambers. Establishing the mens rea of
a senior political figure, as well as a complex, evolving chain of
co-perpetrators engaged in a genocidal campaign-and doing it
all beyond a reasonable doubt-is a large and cumbersome task.
In this case, the ICJ allotted Bosnia eighteen court sessions to
present its case and gave Serbia the same amount of time to re-
ply.76
In cases such as Corfu Channel, which involved a relatively
limited factual inquiry, the ICJ's procedures can accommodate
the evidence necessary to establish such a high standard of
76. See Verbatim Record of Public Sitting, Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.)
(Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007), at 10 (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/91/10523.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2008); Verbatim Record of Public Sit-
ting, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007), at 10 (May 2,
2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/10767.pdf (last visited Mar.
20, 2008).
ADJUDICATING GENOCIDE
proof. Resolving a case like the Bosnia genocide case, which in-
volved allegations of thousands of individual crimes spanning
more than three years, presents an adjudicatory challenge of a
magnitude that overwhelms the ICJ's procedural capacity. The
ICTY, often criticized for the size of the cases and the length of
its trials, provides a benchmark for assessing the ICJ's ability to
conduct a parallel inquiry encompassing contested events from
several ICTY trials; for applying the same law regarding geno-
cide; and for applying the same high standard of proof.
C. Methods of Proof
Bosnia adduced evidence from a variety of sources in sup-
port of its allegations of genocide. It relied on resolutions by the
Security Council and General Assembly; reports by U.N. officials
and subsidiary bodies (Secretary-General, General Assembly, Se-
curity Council, Security Council's Commission of Experts, Com-
mission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and Special Rap-
pateur on Yugoslavia); judgments, decisions, and other docu-
ments from the ICTY, as well as evidence adduced during ICTY
trials; and government publications, documents from nongov-
ernmental organizations, media reports, articles, books, and wit-
nesses and experts who appeared before the ICTY itself.7 7
As a preliminary matter, the ICJ set out general rules for
evaluating evidence proffered by the parties or requested by the
ICJ. Its guidelines accept, with caution, materials prepared by
the parties for the case and materials that came from a solitary
source. The ICJ expressed its preference for evidence from con-
temporaneous accounts by people with direct knowledge. It
stated that it would give "particular attention" to reliable evi-
dence against the interest of the state that offers it. 8 In a refer-
ence to the type of evidence produced by ICTY trials, "[t]he
Court moreover notes that evidence obtained by examination of
persons directly involved, and who were subsequently cross-ex-
amined by judges skilled in examination and experienced in as-
sessing large amounts of factual information, some of it of a
77. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 211.
78. See id. 213 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 41 (June 27)).
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technical nature, merits special attention."7 9
1. United Nations Reports and Resolutions
The ICJ placed particular reliance on a report submitted by
the U.N. Secretary-General to the General Assembly in Novem-
ber 1999 entitled The Fall of Srebrenica.8 ° The report is 113 pages
long and details the U.N.'s involvement with Srebrenica from
the period beginning with its designation as a "safe haven" by
the Security Council on April 16, 1993, until the Security Coun-
cil endorsed the Dayton Peace Accords on December 15, 1995.
The ICJ, approving the methodology of the report, placed signif-
icant weight on its findings of facts and conclusions.81 The re-
port was the first time the U.N. had made public an account of
Srebrenica, pieced together from its personnel in the region, in-
cluding Dutchbat soldiers and military observers assigned to the
Srebrenica area.8 2 The ICJ stated that "[t]he care taken in pre-
paring the report, its comprehensive sources and the indepen-
dence of those responsible for its preparation all lend considera-
ble authority to it. As will appear later in this Judgment, the
Court has gained substantial assistance from this report. ''1 3 The
79. Id. (citing Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo
v. Uganda), 2005 I.CJ. 116, 61 (Dec. 19)).
80. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/54/
549 (Nov. 15, 1999) [hereinafter The Fall of Srebrenica].
81. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 230. The ICJ referred to the Secre-
tary-General's summary of the report's methodology:
This report has been prepared on the basis of archival research within the
United Nations system, as well as on the basis of interviews with individuals
who, in one capacity or another, participated in or had knowledge of the
events in question. In the interest of gaining a clearer understanding of these
events, I have taken the exceptional step of entering into the public record
information from the classified files of the United Nations. In addition, I
would like to record my thanks to those Member States, organizations and
individuals who provided information for this report. A list of persons inter-
viewed in this connection is attached as annex 1. While that list is fairly exten-
sive, time, as well as budgetary and other constraints, precluded interviewing
many other individuals who would be in a position to offer important perspec-
tives on the subject at hand. In most cases, the interviews were conducted on a
non-attribution basis to encourage as candid a disclosure as possible. I have
also honoured the request of those individuals who provided information for
this report on the condition that they not be identified.
See id. 228 (citing The Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 80, 8).
82. See The Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 80, at 57.
83. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 230.
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ICJ proceeded to refer to the report dozens of times. The ICJ
did not consider the possibility of bias, however, in that the re-
port was prepared by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who was the
under-secretary-general in charge of peacekeeping operations
during some of the period being examined. 4
The Srebrenica report was not the first report on Bosnia
prepared under the auspices of the Secretary-General's office. In
1992, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, the Secre-
tary-General was directed to form an impartial commission to
investigate claimed violations of international law in the former
Yugoslavia. This commission issued a comprehensive report
gathering and analyzing large volumes of evidence and applying
international law. The ICJ relied extensively on this report,
known as the Commission of Experts Report.85 The ICJ relied on this
report in coming to its conclusions regarding several Serb prison
camps in Bosnia, including Batkovi, 86 Omarska,87 Trnopolje,88
Keraterm,89 Manjada,9 ° Luka,91 and K-P Dom;92 regarding kill-
84. See The Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 80, 5. In Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo, the ICJ stressed how important it was that such reports be "challenged by
impartial persons for the correctness of what [they contain] ." See Armed Activities on
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, 61 (Dec.
19).
85. The Secretary-General, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursu-
ant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/
1994/674 (May 27, 1994) [hereinafter Commission of Experts Report].
86. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 255 (citing Commission of Experts
Report, supra note 85, Vol. V, Annex X, at 9); see also id. 307 (citing Commission of
Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. IV, Annex VIII & Annex X).
87. See id. 262 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. TV, Annex
VIII, at 222); see also id. 312 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. V,
Annex VIII, at 207-22).
88. See id. 267 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. IV, Annex
V, at 10); see also id. 314 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. V,
Annex VIII, at 251-253).
89. See id. 265 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. I, Annex V,
445 & Vol. IV, 1932); see also id. 313 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note
85, Vol. IV, Annex VIII, at 225, 231, 233, 238).
90. See id. 270 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. IV, It 370-
76); see also id. 315 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. IV, Annex
VIII, at 50-54).
91. See id. 271 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. IV, Annex
VIII, at 93, 101); see also id. 317 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol.
IV, Annex VIII, at 93-97).
92. See id. 309 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. IV, at 128-
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ings in the Prijedor region 93 and sex crimes in the municipality
of Zvornik;94 and regarding Sarajevo,9" the forced deportation of
non-Serbs,96 and the destruction of cultural property.9 7
Although these two reports feature most prominently
among the U.N. materials used by the ICJ, the ICJ also relied on
other U.N. sources. The ICJ adopted some assertions contained
in Security Council and General Assembly resolutions to resolve
factual issues related to Prijedor, Gora;de,99 Banja Luka, 1°°
Sanski Most,' and Srebrenica.' ° 2 Despite this reliance on Secur-
ity Council and General Assembly resolutions, the ICJ declined
to give any weight to the Security Council's characterization of
events in Bosnia as "genocide."' ° However, the ICJ did rely on
the General Assembly's Resolution 50/193 of 1995 with respect
to the commission of international crimes in Sarajevo, Tuzla,
Biha6, and Gora.de. °4 The ICJ's use of Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions as evidence nevertheless gives evi-
dentiary credibility to essentially political statements. Such use
of those statements may have the unintended consequence of
causing member states to be reluctant to make strong statements
in U.N. resolutions out of fear that an international court may
rely on those statements in the future.
93. See id. 257 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. I, Annex III,
at 154-55); see also id. 311 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. V,
Annex X, at 41).
94. See id. 305 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. V, Annex
IX, at 54).
95. See id. 1 247 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. II, Annex
VI, at 8); see also id. 91 323-24 (citing Commission ofExperts Report, supra note 85, Vol. II,
Annex VI, at 8, 17).
96. See id. 99 330-31 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. I, An-
nex TV, at 55 et seq.).
97. See id. 1 337 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, Vol. I, Annex IV,
at 5, 9, 21 ff. & Annex V, at 106).
98. See id. 274 (citing S.C. Res. 819, U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Apr. 16, 1993), G.A.
Res. 48/153, 1 5-6 U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/153 (Feb. 7, 1994), and G.A. Res. 49/196,
6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/196 (Mar. 10, 1995)).
99. See id. 275 (citing S.C. Res. 913, U.N. Doc. S/RES/913 (Apr. 22, 1994)).
100. See id. (citing S.C. Res. 941, U.N. Doc. S/RES/941 (Sept. 23, 1994) and S.C.
Res. 1019, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1019 (Nov. 9, 1995)).
101. See id. (citing S.C. Res. 1019, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1019 (Nov. 9, 1995)).
102. See id. (citing S.C. Res. 1019, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1019 (Nov. 9, 1995)).
103. See G.A. Res. 47/147, 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/147 (Apr. 26, 1993) (in
which the Security Council characterized acts of ethnic cleansing as genocide).
104. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 275 (citing G.A. Res. 50/193, 6,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/193 (Mar. 11, 1996)).
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The ICJ also relied on reports by the U.N. Special Rap-
porteur with respect to Sarajevo 11 5 and events in the town of
Hambarine in Prijedor. a°6 In addition to U.N. sources, the ICJ
considered communications and documents from the U.S. De-
partment of State related to the camps at Batkovi t0 °7 and Ker-
aterm,10 8 and to crimes committed in the town of Zvornik.'0 9
The ICJ also relied on correspondence and witness reports from
the Permanent Mission of Austria to the U.N. regarding condi-
tions at the Keraterm prison camp,' and benefited from re-
ports issued by Helsinki Watch, a non-governmental organiza-
tion, when making findings related to the mistreatment of wo-
men in K-P Dom"' and conditions at the Keraterm camp. 1 2
2. Media Reports
The ICJ placed varying degrees of weight on media reports,
depending on its determination of each report's reliability. The
ICJ cited a BBC production entitled The Death of Yugoslavia, a
documentary comprised, in significant part, of news footage and
contemporaneous interviews of many of the protagonists, includ-
ing, among others, Milogevie, Borisav Jovie, and Vojiglav Segelj.
This documentary assisted the ICJ in its findings regarding the
crimes committed in Zvornik. a13 Bosnia submitted an article
105. See id. 246 (citing U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights,
Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47 (Nov. 17, 1993) (submitted by Tadeusz Mazowiecki)
and U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Periodic Report, I 69-70, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/6
(July 5, 1995) (submitted by Tadeusz Mazowiecki).
106. See id. 258 (citing The Secretary-General, Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Prepared by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of Commission
Resolution 1992/S-1/1 and Economic and Social Council Decision 1992/305, 17, delivered to
the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/24809, A/47/666 (Nov. 17,
1992)).
107. See id. 1 255 (citing a U.S. State Department Dispatch dated April 19, 1993).
108. See id. 1 265 (citing a U.S. State Department Dispatch dated March 5, 1993).
109. See id. 1 250 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, which relied, in
part, on a declassified U.S. State Department document).
110. See id. 1 265 (citing a letter from the Permanent Representative of Austria to
the U.N. dated March 5, 1993); see also id. 1 313 (relying on witness accounts reported
by the Permanent Mission of Austria to the U.N.).
111. See id. 1 309 (citing Commission of Experts Report, supra note 85, which relied, in
turn, on a report by Helsinki Watch).
112. See id. 1 313.
113. See id. 250.
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published in the French newspaper Le Monde that reported both
the interim results of a joint World Health Organiza-
tion-European Union study regarding sexual assaults against
men and the finding of a non-governmental organization that
approximately 5000 men had been sexually mistreated. The ICJ,
however, summarily rejected the Le Monde article as unreliable,
citing the secondary nature of its information and the prelimi-
nary nature of the underlying research.1 14
3. Public Statements of the Parties
The ICJ has, in the past, relied on statements made by par-
ties that were against their self-interest.'1 5 In this case, Bosnia
argued that a particular statement by government officials bore
great significance. In 2005, after a graphic video depicting Ser-
bian paramilitaries executing six men and boys from Srebrenica
was shown during the Miloevie trial, the Serbian government is-
sued the following statement: "Those who committed those
crimes and the ones who ordered and organized that massacre did not
represent Serbia or Montenegro, but an undemocratic regime of terror and
death, which was opposed by the majority of people in Serbia and
Montenegro."116
Bosnia sought to rely on this statement as an admission by
the current government that what occurred in Srebrenica consti-
tuted the crime of genocide and that the Milosevic regime bore
responsibility for committing it.11 7 In earlier decisions the ICJ
relied significantly on statements by state officials that contra-
dicted the state's position before the ICJ." 8 In Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the United States
114. See id. 1 357.
115. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 41 Uune 27).
116. Serbia's Ambiguous Response to Srebrenica, RADio FREE EUROPE, July 1, 2005,
http://www.rferl.org/reports/balkan-report/2005/07/20-010705.asp (emphasis ad-
ded).
117. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 377.
118. In the Temple ofPreah Vihear case, the ICJ placed significance on declarations
made by government officials in 1950 consenting to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. See Tem-
ple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1961 I.CJ. 17, 30-32 (May 26). In the subse-
quentjudgment on the merits, the ICJ placed weight on statements made by the Thai
prince and on a map tendered by Thailand indicating the contested temple was on
Cambodian territory-despite the fact that this evidence contradicted the position of
Thailand's representatives in Court. See Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.),
1962 I.C.J. 6, 30-32 Uune 15). In the ICJ Genocide Judgment, the Vice-President took the
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withdrew from the proceedings. After considering what weight
to place on public statements of U.S. officials-statements that
were recorded in the media or by the organizations before which
they were made-the ICJ decided to accept as evidence of admis-
sions against self-interest." 9
Nevertheless, the ICJ declined to rely on the preceding
statement by Serb officials. The ICJ noted that the statement was
of a political nature and "not intended as an admission . . . in
complete contradiction to the submissions made by the Respon-
dent before this Court, both at the time of the declaration and
subsequently. ' 120 The ICJ would not hold a party bound by a
statement that the party did not intend to be legally binding
against it. 1 2 1 In reaching this conclusion, the ICJ ignored the
possibility that authoritative statements made by senior officials
position that the context of the statement cut in favor of viewing the statement as an
admission of responsibility.
To the extent that the effect of a unilateral act depends on the intent behind
it and the context within which it was made, we need only consider this: the
Serbian Government at the time was attempting to distance itself-as a new
and democratic regime-from the regime which had come before it, in light
of the revelation of horrible crimes committed by paramilitary units (the Scor-
pions) on national Serbian and international television. The intent was to
acknowledge the previous regime's responsibility for those crimes, and to
make a fresh start by distancing the new regime therefrom. A clearer inten-
tion to 'admit' past wrongs cannot be had.
ICJ Genocide Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of Vice President Al-Khasawneh), supra
note 32, 58.
119. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 41 (June 27) ("The material before the Court also includes state-
ments made by representatives of States, sometimes at the highest political level ....
The Court takes the view that statements of this kind, emanating from high-ranking
official political figures, sometimes indeed of the highest rank, are of particular proba-
tive value when they acknowledge facts or conduct unfavourable to the State repre-
sented by the person who made them. They may then be construed as a form of admis-
sion."). In this case the Nicaraguan government had offered statements by then presi-
dent Ronald Regan and then Secretary of State George P. Shultz.
120. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 378.
121. "Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to
take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being
bound - the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act." Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472-73 (Dec. 20). The ICJ's findings regarding the binding
character of a unilateral declaration were not without controversy. Consider comments
by Taslim 0. Elias, the former president of the ICJ: "[P] ronouncements on the binding
character of unilateral declarations by France would seem to be highly questionable
and, in any case, not supported either by principle or by authority." TASLIM O. ELIAS,
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 118 (1983).
942 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 31:911
at unguarded moments have probative value if they contradict
the carefully worded pleadings of the parties before the Court.
4. Evidence of a "Genocidal Pattern"
One of the ways that Bosnia sought to meet its burden of
establishing the dolus specialis of genocide was through what it
argued was a consistent pattern of criminal conduct over the
course of several years. 122 It maintained that the striking similar-
ity of criminal conduct (which the ICJ recognized as constituting
the actus reus of genocide) was best explained as being part of
an overall genocidal plan.12' However, the ICJ recognized that
this reliance on pattern evidence represented a deliberate shift
in focus from the mens rea of direct perpetrators to that of se-
nior Bosnian Serb and Serb leaders. 24 Before considering the
pattern evidence itself, the ICJ evaluated a document produced
by the Bosnian Serb Assembly and introduced in several ICTY
trials. The ICJ found that this document, entitled "Decision on
the Strategic Goals of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herze-
govina" ("Strategic Goals"), represented an expression of the
joint view of Radovan Karad~i6 and Milogevi . That document
set out in specific terms the goals of the Serb people in Bosnia
and included the goal of separating the Serb people from the
"other two ethnic communities.' 1 25 The ICJ adopted the Stakie
trial chamber's findings that the document failed to establish
122. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 370 ("[I]t is not surprising that
the picture of the takeovers and the following human and cultural destruction looks
indeed similar from 1991 through 1999. These acts were perpetrated as the expression
of one single project, which basically and effectively included the destruction in whole
or in part of the non-Serb group, wherever this ethnically and religiously defined group
could be conceived as obstructing the all-Serbs-in-one-State group concept.").
123. See id.
124. See id. 371.
125. The document set forth six primary goals for the Serb people:
1. Separation as a state from the other two ethnic communities.
2. A corridor between Semberija and Krajina.
3. The establishment of a corridor in the Drina River valley, i.e., the elimina-
tion of the border between Serbian states.
4. The establishment of a border on the Una and Neretva rivers.
5. The division of the city of Sarajevo into a Serbian part and a Muslim part,
and the establishment of effective state authorities within each part.
6. An outlet to the sea for the Republika Srpska.
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genocidal intent.1 26
After rejecting the "Strategic Goals" document as evidence
of an overall genocidal plan, the ICJ turned to the pattern evi-
dence offered by Bosnia to establish genocidal intent. The ICJ
declined to draw the inferences Bosnia suggested:
The dolus specialis, the specific intent to destroy the group in
whole or in part, has to be convincingly shown by reference
to particular circumstances, unless a general plan to that end
can be convincingly demonstrated to exist; and for a pattern
of conduct to be accepted as evidence of its existence, it
would have to be such that it could only point to the exis-
tence of such intent.12 7
The ICJ did two things in this passage. First, absent convinc-
ing proof of a clear overall genocidal plan, it would confine its
consideration of whether a particular crime was committed with
genocidal intent to evidence directly related to that particular
criminal event. It would not draw inferences based on the simi-
larities in the modus operandi of crimes or examine their tempo-
ral relationship. Absent proof of an overall plan, the ICJ would
examine each crime in an isolated, disconnected fashion. Sec-
ond, pattern evidence could be used to establish the existence of
a genocidal plan only if that evidence excludes all other pos-
sibilities.1 2 Given the similarity between the actus reus of perse-
cution and the actus reus of genocide, coupled with the multi-
plicity of persons contributing to these collective crimes, it is un-
likely that patterns emerging from the actus reus could ever fully
negate the existence of the mens rea of other crimes. The ICJ's
effective disregard of pattern evidence marks an important
methodological departure from the ICTY trial chambers, which
have endorsed the importance of such evidence.'2 9 In the
126. See id. 372 (referring to Prosecutor v. Stakit, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judg-
ment, 91 546-61 (July 31, 2003).
127. Id. 373.
128. See id. 9191 373, 376.
129. See Prosecutor v. Brdcanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 704 (Sept. 1,
2004) ("[T]he specific intent for genocide can be inferred from 'the facts, the concrete
circumstances, or a 'pattern of purposeful action.""); Prosecutor v. Stakid, Case No. IT-
97-24-T, Judgment, 91 526 (July 31, 2003) ("It is generally accepted, particularly in the
jurisprudence of both this tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal, that genocidal dolus
specialis can be inferred either from the facts, the concrete circumstances, or 'a pattern
of purposeful action.'"); see also Prosecutor v. Jelisit, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment,
47 (July 5, 2001) ("Proof of specific intent may, in the absence of direct explicit evi-
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Milokevid case, the ICTY's most closely related case, the trial
chamber relied on pattern evidence in its decision denying a
motion for a judgment of acquittal. 3 ° The ICC's Elements of
Crimes includes, as a material element of genocide, the require-
ment that the "conduct took place in the context of a manifest
pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was
conduct that could itself effect such destruction.""'' This phrase
operates as a threshold to ensure that only those crimes with at
least the potential to bring about the destruction of the group,
or a part of it, are the subject of an ICC prosecution. 132
The ICJ buttressed its decision to dismiss the applicant's re-
liance on pattern evidence by referring to the ICTY prosecutor's
decision not to charge genocide consistently in those areas re-
ferred to by Bosnia's agents.' 33 The ICJ incorrectly assumed that
the prosecutor's exercise of discretion with respect to charging
genocide reflects the probative value of pattern evidence. De-
spite its own conclusion that the crimes of Srebrenica consti-
tuted genocide, the ICJ noted that "[i] n the cases of a number of
accused, relating to events in July 1995 in Srebrenica, charges of
genocide or its related acts have not been brought ....
dence, be inferred from a number of facts and circumstances, such as the general con-
text, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same
group, the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account
of their membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discrimi-
natory acts.").
130. See Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judg-
ment of Acquittal, 248 (June 16, 2004) ("The Trial Chamber notes that the number
of killings and other acts of mistreatment in Bijeljina, Kljuc and Bosanski Novi is lower
than in the other four territories. However, it concludes, that by reason of the geo-
graphic contiguity of these three territories to the other four territories and the relative
similarity in the period of time when both sets of territories were taken over, there is
also sufficient evidence of a genocidal intent in relation to these three territories.").
131. See Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court Official Records, 1st Sess., at 113, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 3-10, 2002)
(listing the following elements of the crime of genocide by killing: "1. The perpetrator
killed one or more persons"; "2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group"; "3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in
whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such"; and "4. The
conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed
against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction"); see also
WILLIAM A. ScHABAs, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 39
(2004) (noting that "[t]he Elements of Crimes adopted by the Assembly of States Par-
ties take a slightly different perspective" with regard to the crime of genocide).
132. See Cassesse, supra note 25, at 349.
133. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 374.
134. Id. 375 (citing Prosecutor v. Erdemovie, Case No. IT-96-22-T (completed);
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5. Incorporating the Work of the ICTY
Bosnia sought to meet much of its burden by relying on the
work of the ICTY. The engagement of the ICJ and ICTY in con-
current inquiries into the alleged genocide in Bosnia forced the
two courts into a somewhat uncomfortable relationship-un-
comfortable largely because of the lack of a formal legal relation-
ship between them. The ICTY's Statute, like those of other
tribunals, is silent with respect to any formal relationship be-
tween itself and the "World Court," or ICJ. 13 5 A former ICJ presi-
dent envisaged that other tribunals and courts, in particular in-
ternational criminal courts, could play an important part in an
overall integrated system of international justice." 6
The absence of any formal relationship between the ICJ and
the ICTY creates the potential for judgments that stand in con-
flict with each other. Decisions by the ICJ are final and cannot
Prosecutor v. Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60 (on appeal); Prosecutor v. Miletie and Gvero,
Case No. IT-05-88; Prosecutor v. Perigit, Case No. IT-04-81 (pending); and Prosecutor v.
Stanigit and Simatovit, Case No. IT-03-69 (pending)). Only the last two cases involve
persons who would pass the ICJ's test for attributability.
135. See R.Y. Jennings, The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of
International Law, 45 INrT'L & COMp. L.Q. 5 (1996) ("There is no kind of structured
relationship between most of them [ICJ and other tribunals generally]. There is not
even the semblance of any kind of hierarchy or system .... Suffice it to say that it is very
difficult to try to make any sort of pattern, much less a structured relationship, of this
mass of tribunals, whether important or petty."). Some commentators have suggested
that the ICJ, as the "World Court," should be at the apex of any international justice
system. See M.C.W. Pinto, Pre-Eminence of the International Court of Justice, in INCREASING
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 281, 283 (Connie Peck &
Roy S. Lee eds., 1997) ("Thus is the stage set for a future hierarchy: the Court is placed
constitutionally and unalterably at the apex of a judicial pyramid of evolving complex-
ity, and we may conclude that any and all types of infractions of international law, even
those currently falling within the competence of more recently created tribunals, could
be brought within the capacious jurisdiction of the Court. All that would be required is
for the disputing States to have referred the matter to the Court as a case for decision.
There seems no jurisdictional obstacle to the Court's administering, for example, an
international criminal law, and its judges, qualified as they are, are no less capable of
determining and applying such rules as exist in the field than those of any other special-
ized 'purpose-built'judicial organ. The Treaties of Rome are still 'treaties and conven-
tions in force' within the meaning of Article 36(1) of the Court's Statute .... ").
136. See Mohammed Bedjaoui, Comments on the Report, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OFJUSTICE: PROCESS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE PAGE, PAGE (D.W. Bowett ed.,
1997) ("I might add with regard to the recent proliferation ofjudicial and quasi-judicial
bodies at the international level, far from prejudicing the future activity of the Court in
The Hague, may help to relieve the Court of certain particular categories of disputes,
thus enabling it to focus on disputes of major political importance. These bodies in-
clude . . . the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia .... ").
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be appealed further.137  Similarly, judgments by the ICTY ap-
peals chamber are final, leaving the parties no further re-
course.' 38 These two courts of last resort-one inquiring into
individual criminal responsibility and the other into state re-
sponsibility based on the attributability of the criminal acts and
states of mind of some of the same people accused before the
ICTY-were considering many of the same events and applying
essentially the same law, and it is possible that they might have
rendered two inconsistent, yet final, judgments. Such an event
would have undermined the international community's confi-
dence in the work of one, or both, of the courts. Judge
Skotnikov referred to this possibility in a separate declaration at-
tached to the ICJ Genocide Judgment:
After having thus established in principle a possibility of arriv-
ing at conclusions different to those of this criminal tribunal
as to whether or not genocide was committed, the Court pro-
ceeded to examine the allegations which had already been
considered and decided on by the ICTY, thus putting itself
potentially on a collision course with the Tribunal. 39
The ICJ majority noted that "[t] his case does however have
an unusual feature. Many of the allegations before this Court
have already been the subject of the processes and decisions of
the ICTY.' 140 It is in this context that the ICJ paid great defer-
ence to the work of the ICTYjudges and placed great weight on
the judgments of the ICTY's appeals and trial chambers. This
deference to the ICTY's work is also evidenced by the ICJ's hav-
137. See ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art. 60 ("The judgment is final and without ap-
peal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court
shall construe it upon the request of any party.").
138. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Extraordinary Plen.
Sess., Rules 119-22, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.40 (July 12, 2007), available at http://www.un.
org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev4Oe.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Rules of Procedure
and Evidence] (affording the parties the right to request a review of the final judgment
upon the discovery of new evidence that could have been a "decisive factor in reaching
a decision").
139. ICJ Genocide Judgment (Declaration ofJudge Skotnikov), supra note 35, at 7.
Judge Skotnikov goes on to state that "[t]his kind of collision of course has not oc-
curred in practice. However, this does not make the Court's failure to strike a proper
balance under the Genocide Convention between the Court's jurisdiction and that of a
criminal tribunal any lesser." Id.
140. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 212.
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ing adopted all of the factual findings of ICTYjudgments and all
but one legal conclusion.
The sole, but important, legal ruling concerned the test to
be applied for determining when the acts of a state's non-de
jure organs can be attributed to the state itself. When consider-
ing whether the genocidal conduct in Srebrenica was attributa-
ble to Serbia, the ICJ applied the "effective control" test, a test
the ICJ first articulated in Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua."' In its presentation to the ICJ, Bosnia
questioned the merit of applying the "effective control" standard
in the case of genocide and brought to the ICJ's attention the
Tadi6 appeal judgment, in which the ICTY appeals chamber de-
termined that the appropriate test for deciding whether the con-
flict was international in nature was whether the FRY exercised
"overall control" over the Bosnian Serbs. That is, the appeals
chamber determined that, in lieu of having to prove that the
FRY exercised "effective control" during each individual opera-
tion during which crimes were committed, it was enough to es-
tablish that it exercised "overall control"-thereby rejecting the
ICJ's standard in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua.142 The ICJ, after giving careful consideration to the
appeals chamber's reasoning in Tadie, rejected it on the grounds
that such a legal conclusion was not "indispensable" to that
chamber's exercise of jurisdiction in adjudicating individual
criminal responsibility. The ICJ reserved to itself the primacy to
make determinations of general international law.'4 ' The ICJ al-
lowed that "overall control" may be an appropriate standard for
determining whether or not a conflict is international in nature
for purposes of applying international humanitarian law but
held that the more rigorous test of "effective control" is the
141. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J..14, 64-65 (une 27).
142. See Prosecutor v. Tadit, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 120 (July 15, 1999)
("Consequently, for the attribution to a State of acts of these groups it is sufficient to
require that the group as a whole be under the overall control of the State.").
143. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 1 403 ("As stated above, the Court
attaches the utmost importance to the factual and legal findings made by the ICTY in
ruling on the criminal liability of the accused before it and, in the present case, the
Court takes fullest account of the ICTY's trial and appellate judgments dealing with the
events underlying the dispute. The situation is not the same for positions adopted by
the ICTY on issues of general international law which do not lie within the specific
purview of its jurisdiction and, moreover, the resolution of which is not always necessary
for deciding the criminal cases before it.").
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more appropriate test for determining whether a state bears re-
sponsibility for crimes committed in another state.'
4 4
The ICJ's willingness to place such significant weight on the
jurisprudence of ICTYjudgments is a reflection of its confidence
in the methodology employed by the ICTY. The ICJ considered
ICTY trials to be "rigorous" proceedings that include a presump-
tion of innocence and high standard of proof, and reasoned that
they are therefore suitable for serious consideration by the
ICJ. 145 The ICJ enumerated other features of the ICTY's trial
procedures that lent authority to its findings:
146
- The Tribunal respected the minimum guarantees of proce-
dural fairness found in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, including the right to counsel, to
cross-examine witnesses, to call witnesses, and to remain si-
lent.
- Accused are provided with pretrial disclosure, and they
benefit from the prosecutor's obligation to disclose excul-
patory material.
1 4 7
- The Tribunal has the authority to require member states of
the United Nations to cooperate and produce evidence.
- The trial chambers may admit any relevant evidence and
144. See id. 405 ("It should first be observed that logic does not require the same
test to be adopted in resolving the two issues, which are very different in nature: the
degree and nature of a State's involvement in an armed conflict on another State's
territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as international, can very
well, and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and nature of involve-
ment required to give rise to that State's responsibility for a specific act committed in
the course of the conflict.").
145. See id. 220 ("The processes of the Tribunal leading to final findings are
rigorous. Accused are presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. They are entitled to listed minimum guarantees (taken from the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), including the right to counsel, to examine wit-
nesses against them, to obtain the examination of witnesses on their behalf, and not to
be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt.").
146. See id.
147. Rule 68(i) of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides that "the
Prosecutor shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the Defence any material which in
the actual knowledge of the Prosecutor may suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt
of the accused or affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence." ICTY Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, supra note 138. This provision has been interpreted to include not
only material directly impacting on the guilt or innocence of the accused, but material
that may be helpful in the defense. See Prosecutor v. Delalie, Case No. IT-96-21, Deci-
sion on the Request of the Accused Halim Deli Pursuant to Rule 68 for Exculpatory
Information, 12 (June 24, 1997). "Exculpatory material within the meaning of Rule
68 of the Rules is such material which is known to the Prosecutor and which is favour-
able to the accused." Id.
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are required to give a reasoned written opinion to which
dissenting opinions may be appended.
- Each party has a right to appeal a trial chamber's judg-
ment.
The ICJ concluded that it should in principle accept as
highly persuasive relevant findings of fact made by the ICTY at
trial, unless of course they have been upset on appeal. For the
same reasons, any examination by the ICTY based on the facts as
so found (for instance, about the existence of the required in-
tent, or dolus specialis of genocide) is also entitled to due
weight.14
The ICJ stated its intention not only to accept findings of
fact made by the ICTYjudges, but also to give due weight to their
conclusions of law, in particular with respect to the critical issue
of genocidal intent.149 Because there is no formal legal relation-
ship between the two courts and the ICJ is not bound by ICTY
judgments, the ICJ-rather than formally taking judicial notice
of those judgments-considered them as "evidence," and as evi-
dence upon which it placed the greatest weight.
6. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia Judgments
In deference to the ICTY, the ICJ adopted several determi-
nations by the trial and appeals chambers of the "ultimate issues"
from several cases. These ultimate findings involved both factual
findings and legal conclusions that resolved primary issues in the
trials. 15 ° The ICJ's almost wholesale adoption of the ICTY's fac-
148. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 223.
149. See id.
As stated above, the Court attaches the utmost importance to the factual and
legal findings made by the ICTY in ruling on the criminal liability of the ac-
cused before it and, in the present case, the court takes fullest account of the
ICTY's trial and appellate judgments dealing with the events underlying the
dispute.
Id. 403.
150. Judge Tomka notes in his separate opinion:
The International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over the individual per-
petrators of those serious atrocities. Article IX of the Genocide Convention
confers on the Court jurisdiction to determine whether the Respondent com-
plied with its obligations under the Genocide Convention. In making this de-
termination in the present case, the Court was entitled to draw legal conse-
quences from the judgments of the ICTY, particularly those which dealt with
charges of genocide or any of the other acts proscribed in Article III.
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tual and legal findings with respect to the events of Srebrenica is
the clearest example. The ICJ incorporated long passages of the
Krsti6 trial judgment to set out its factual findings regarding
Srebrenica151 and noted that while Serbia contested the number
of people killed in Srebrenica, it did not "essentially question"
the factual findings of the Krstie trial chamber.
152
The ICJ deferred to the findings of the ICTYjudges to the
extent that the factual issues contested by the parties paralleled
those raised in the Krstie or Blagojevie trials. The ICJ adopted the
findings of both judgments that the killings and serious bodily
harm caused to the victims of Srebrenica established the actus
reus of genocide. 151 "The Court is fully persuaded that both kill-
ings within the terms of Article II(a) of the Convention, and acts
causing serious bodily or mental harm within the terms of Arti-
cle II(b) thereof occurred during the Srebrenica massacre. 15 4
One of the key issues faced by the ICJ was whether the mas-
sacres arising out of Srebrenica were accompanied by the requi-
site dolus specialis of genocide and, if so, when it came into exis-
tence. This issue became especially important with respect to
whether Serbia would have had sufficient notice of the impend-
ing genocide to withdraw their significant assistance to Bosnian
ICJ Genocide Judgment (Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka), supra note 19, 9 73.
151. The ICJ relied on the Krstie Trial Judgment's summary of the facts:
The events surrounding the Bosnian Serb take-over of the United Nations
("UN") "safe area" of Srebrenica in Bosnian and Herzegovina, in July 1995,
have become well known to the world. Despite a UN Security Council resolu-
tion declaring that the enclave was to be "free from armed attack or any other
hostile act," units of the Bosnian Serb Army ("VRS") launched an attack and
captured the town. Within a few days, approximately 25,000 Bosnian Muslims,
most of them women, children and elderly people who were living in the area,
were uprooted and, in an atmosphere of terror, loaded onto overcrowded
buses by the Bosnian Serb forces and transported across the confrontation
lines into Bosnian Muslim-held territory. The military-aged Bosnian Muslim
men of Srebrenica, however, were consigned to a separate fate. As thousands
of them attempted to flee the area, they were taken prisoner, detained in bru-
tal conditions and then executed. More than 7,000 people were never seen
again.
ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 278 (quoting Prosecutor v. Krstie, Case No. IT-
98-33-T, Judgment, I 1 (Aug. 2, 2001) (footnotes omitted)).
152. See id.
153. Id. 290 (quoting Prosecutor v. Krstie, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 1 543
(Apr. 19, 2004) and Prosecutor v. Blagojevit, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 9 644-45
(Jan. 17, 2005)).
154. Id. 291.
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Serb troops in Srebrenica. 155 To establish genocidal intent with
respect to Srebrenica, Bosnia submitted a document referred to
as "Directive 7," issued by Bosnian Serb President Karad2it on
March 8, 1995, which stated that the purpose of the combat op-
erations in the Srebrenica area was to create "an unbearable situ-
ation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life
for the inhabitants of both enclaves." 156 Bosnia pointed to this
as a clear articulation of the intent to "destroy in whole or in
part" the Muslim population of Srebrenica. The ICJ thus re-
jected the prosecution's argument that Krstie's awareness of
these directives and his implementation of them evidenced the
dolus specialis of genocide. The ICJ adopted the "ruling of the
Appeals Chamber in Krsti( case that the directives were 'insuffi-
ciently clear' to establish specific intent (dolus specialis) on the
part of the members of the Main Staff who issued them.1157 In
the words of the appeals chamber, the most that the document
did was to alert Krstie to the:
[M]ilitary plan to take over Srebrenica and Zepa, and to cre-
ate conditions that would lead to the total defeat of the Bos-
nian Muslim military forces in the area, without whose protec-
tion the civilian population would be compelled to leave the
area. It also alerted Radislav Krsti6 to the intention of the
Main Staff to obstruct humanitarian aid to the civilians of
Srebrenica so that their conditions would become unbearable
and further motivate them to leave the area. 158
From this statement by the Krsti6 appeals chamber, the ICJ con-
cluded that if such evidence was insufficiently clear to establish
dolus specialis for one of the immediate commanders responsible
for the Srebrenica massacre, then it could not establish dolus
specialis for senior actors in Serbia.
Bosnia's representatives also submitted a military report
from the Bratunac Brigade dated July 4, 1995, outlining the "fi-
155. Id.
156. Id. 280 (quoting Prosecutor v. Blagojevi6, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment,
88-89 (Jan. 17, 2005)). This directive was later followed by "Directive 7.1" issued by
General Mladit on March 31, 1995, which sought to implement "Directive 7" by con-
ducting combat operations around the enclave. See Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-
33-A, Judgment, 88-89 (Apr. 19, 2004).
157. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 281. "The Court has already quoted
... the passage from the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber in the Krstie case rejecting
the Prosecutor's attempted reliance on the Directive given earlier in July." Id. 293.
158. Prosecutor v. Krstit, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 1 90 (April 19, 2004).
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nal goal" of the VRS. The document stated that the "enemy's
[Muslims occupying Srebrenica] life has to be made unbearable
and their temporary stay in the enclave impossible so that they
leave en masse as soon as possible, realizing that they cannot sur-
vive there." The ICJ recalled some of the evidence of the
Blagojevie trial and adopted the trial chamber's findings that "the
object stated in the report, like the 1992 Strategic Objectives,
does not envisage the destruction of the Muslims in Srebrenica,
but rather their departure."'59 The ICJ went on to follow the
Blagojevi court's lead and to place little weight on those re-
ports.16 The ICJ reviewed the trial chambers' judgments in
both the Krstie and Blagojevie cases and adopted their factual
findings and legal conclusions regarding when dolus specialis was
established. a6'
When there was not complete parity between the ultimate
issues faced by the two courts, the ICJ adopted the legal tests
distilled by ICTYjudges in their efforts to interpret the law of
genocide. Thus, in applying the Genocide Convention, the ICJ
looked to the ICTY for guidance in interpreting the phrase "part
of the group" and in developing relevant legal tests. The ICJ
adopted a tripartite test for purposes of the Genocide Conven-
tion, with each criterion taken directly from an ICTY case.
The first criterion was "substantiality"-that is, "the intent
must be to destroy at least a substantial part of the particular
group."'162 The ICJ found that both the ICTY and the ICTR con-
sistently imposed the requirement that the relevant portion of
the entire group be significant enough to have an impact on the
group as a whole.' 6 3 The ICJ did add its view that this criterion
159. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 279.
160. See id.
161. The Court's conclusion, fortified by the Judgements of the Trial Cham-
bers in Krstie and Blagojevie cases, is that the necessary intent was not estab-
lished until after the change in the military objective and after the takeover of
Srebrenica, on about 12 or 13July. This may be significant for the application
of the obligations of the Respondent under the Convention. The Court has no
reason to depart from the Tribunal's determination that the necessary specific
intent (dolus specialis) was established and that it was not established until that
time.
Id. 295 (parenthesis omitted).
162. Id. 1 198.
163. See id. (referring to Prosecutor v. Krstit, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 1 8-
11 (April 19, 2004) and Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment,
Reasons (June 1, 2001)).
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was the most important.164 The second criterion concerns the
geographic location of the targeted victims. The ICJ held that
"genocide may be found to have been committed where the in-
tent is to destroy the group within a geographically limited area,"
the test used by the Krsti( appeals chamber and the Stakie trial
chamber.165 The ICJ took the final criterion from the Krstie ap-
peals judgment. It is a qualitative one looking to whether the
portion of the entire group is either emblematic or essential to
the survival of the entire group. 166
Another example in which the ICJ applied a legal test devel-
oped in the ICTY is the ICJ's adoption of the legal rule that the
protected group must be defined positively (that is, Muslims of
Eastern Bosnia). Bosnia, recognizing that Bosnian Croats were
in many cases subjected to the same treatment as Bosnian Mus-
lims, had proposed that the group could be defined negatively
by its ethnic characteristic (i.e., non-Serb).1 6 7 The ICJ adopted
164. See id. 201 ("The above list of criteria is not exhaustive, but, as just indi-
cated, the substantiality criterion is critical. They are essentially those stated by the
Appeals Chamber in the Krsti6 case, although the Court does give this first criterion
priority."). This interpretation differs from the view held by some scholars that theoret-
ically the killing of a small number could constitute the crime of genocide. See MET-
TRAUX, supra note 11, at 236 ("From a numerical point of view, individual criminal
responsibility for genocide covers a range which goes - theoretically - from a situation
where one person is killed to vast criminal enterprises where thousands are put to
death.").
165. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 199.
166. Id. 200. The Krstid appeals chamber defined this qualitative criterion as
follows:
The number of individuals targeted should be evaluated not only in absolute
terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group. In addition
to the numeric size of the targeted portion, its prominence within the group
can be a useful consideration. If a specific part of the group is emblematic of
the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding that
the part qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4.
Prosecutor v. Krstit, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 12 (Apr. 19, 2004) (footnote
omitted).
167. See Mohamed Elewa Badar, From The Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: De-
fining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 73, 136 (2004).
Most notably, the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav Tribunal has interpreted the
scope of the enumerated discriminatory grounds of persecution broadly. For
example, groups and "non-groups" in the former Yugoslavia-that is, "Mus-
lims" (Kupreskic case), "non-Croat" (Blaskic case), and "non-Serb" (Tadic
case) can be the object of persecution. Thus, a discriminatory mental state
against a group negatively defined can satisfy the "grounds" requirement
under Article 5 of the Yugoslav Statute.
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the conclusion of the Stakie appeals judgment that the targeted
group must be defined positively.' 68 In some instances, the ICJ
adopted discrete factual findings of the ICTY when the ultimate
questions presented by those trials were not directly relevant to
the ICJ's inquiry. With respect to killings in and around the
Prijedor region that were alleged to be violations of Article 11 (a)
of the Genocide Convention, the ICJ adopted the findings of the
Brdanin and Stakie trial chambers that "many people were killed
during the attacks by the Bosnian Serb army on predominantly
Bosnian Muslim villages and towns throughout the Prijedor mu-
nicipality and several massacres of Muslims took place.' 69 The
ICJ also adopted the factual findings of the Brianin trial cham-
ber with respect to the killing of Bosnian Muslims and Croats in
six Bosnian municipalities. 7 '
In evaluating Bosnia's claim that the repeated shelling and
sniping in Sarajevo constituted a violation of Article 11(a) of the
Genocide Convention, the ICJ looked to the Galie case and
adopted some of the trial chamber's factual findings.' 7 ' In as-
sessing Bosnia's claim under Article 11(c) with respect to Sara-
jevo, the ICJ relied on the trial and appeals judgments in that
case.' 72 The ICJ not only adopted the explicit factual findings of
168. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 1 195 (citing Prosecutor v. Stakit, Case
No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, 11 20-28 (Mar. 22, 2006)).
169. Id. 1 261 (quoting Prosecutor v. StakiC, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, 544
(July 31, 2003)).
170. See id. 1 274 (quoting Prosecutor v. Brctanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment,
465 (Sept. 1, 2004)). "In sum, the Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that, considering all the incidents described in this section of the judgement, at
least 1669 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were killed by Bosnian Serbs forces, all
of whom were non-combatants." Id.
171. The Court adopts the Galie trial chamber's determination that civilians living
in Sarajevo were the subject of attacks by Serb forces. See id. 248.
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY, in its Judgment of 5 December 2003 in the
Galit case examined specific incidents in the area of Sarajevo, for instance the
shelling of the Markale market on 5 February 1994 which resulted in the kill-
ing of 60 persons. The majority of the Trial Chamber found that 'civilians in
ABiH-held areas of Sarajevo were directly or indiscriminately attacked from
SRK-controlled territory during the Indictment Period, and that as a result
and as a minimum, hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands others
were injured,' the Trial Chamber further concluded that '[i]n sum, the major-
ity of the Trial Chamber finds that each of the crimes alleged in the Indict-
ment, crimes of terror, attacks in civilians, murder and inhumane acts, were
committed by SRK forces during the Indictment Period.'
Id. (parantheses omitted).
172. "The Court notes that in the Galie case, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY found
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Gali6, but also adopted the inferences that the Galie trial cham-
ber drew from these facts. 173
Bosnia alleged that the prisoner camps that Serbia main-
tained in Bosnia violated Article 11(a) of the Genocide Conven-
tion. Although the relevant ICTY cases either did not include
genocide charges or ended with an acquittal on the charge of
genocide, the ICJ adopted many of the factual findings of the
trial and appeals chambers. The ICJ adopted factual findings
with respect to camps in Omarska,1 74 Trnopolje, 175 Manjata, Ker-
aterm, 176 K-P Dom,177 Luka,178 and Boganski Samac. 179 For alle-
that the Serb forces (the SRK) conducted a campaign of sniping and shelling against
the civilian population of Sarajevo." Id. 325 (referring to Prosecutor v. Galit, Case No.
IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 583 (Dec. 5, 2003)).
173. The ICJ quoted the following passage from Galie5:
[T] he attacks on civilians were numerous, but were not consistently so intense
as to suggest an attempt by the SRK to wipe out or even deplete the civilian
population through attrition... the only reasonable conclusion in light of the
evidence in the Trial Record is that the primary purpose of the campaign was
to instill in the civilian population a state of extreme fear.
Id. 328 (quoting Prosecutor v. Galit, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 583 (Dec. 5,
2003)).
174. The ICJ adopted the findings of the Tadi6, Brdanin, and Stakid chambers (with
respect to the conditions at the Omarska camp) for the purpose of assessing Bosnia's
claims under Article 11(a) of the Genocide Convention, see ICJ Genocide Judgment,
supra note 2, 263, and of the Kvoeka trial chamber for assessing the claims under
Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention, see id. 348.
175. The ICJ adopted the findings of the Stakie and Bridanin cases regarding the
conditions at the Trnopolje camp in assessing Bosnia's Article 11(a) claims. See id. 268.
It adopted the findings of Stakie trial chamber with respect to the Article 11(c) viola-
tions. See id. 350.
176. The Court adopted the findings of the Sikirica trial chamber with respect to
conditions at the Keraterm camp that were alleged to be in violation of Article 11(a) of
the Genocide Convention, see id. 266, and the findings of the Stakie trial chamber for
alleged violations of Article 11(c) in Keraterm.
177. With respect to prisoner camps in Fo~a, the Court adopted the conclusions of
the Krnojelac trial chamber in evaluating Bosnia's claims that the camp violated Article
II(a) of the Genocide Convention. "The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that all but three of the persons listed in Schedule C to the Indictment were
killed at the KP Dom." Id. 254 (quoting Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T,
Judgment, 330 (Mar. 15, 2002)). WAith respect to alleged violations of Article 11(b) of
the Genocide Convention, the Court relied on the findings of the Kunarac trial cham-
ber. See id. 310. With respect to violations of Article 11(c), the Court once again relied
on the Krnojelac Trial Judgment. See id. 347.
178. With respect to the Luka camp, the Court adopted the conclusion not only
that a number of people were killed, but also that the killings constituted a material
element of genocide. See id. 272 (quoting Prosecutor v. Jelisit, Case No. IT-95-10-T,
Judgment, 65 (Dec. 14, 1999)) ("[A]lthough the Trial Chamber is not in a position to
establish the precise number of victims ascribable to Goran Jelisit for the period in the
indictment, it notes that, in this instance, the material element of the crimes of geno-
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gations regarding serious bodily and mental harm, including
rape and other sexual crimes, as a violation of Article II(b) of
the Genocide Convention, the ICJ adopted the findings of the
Kunarac trial chamber that "many women were raped repeatedly
by Bosnian Serb soldiers or policemen in the city of Foia."' °
Many of the factual findings regarding the massacres at Srebren-
ica are constructed from excerpts taken directly from the
BlagojevW and Krsti cases, supplemented with references to the
secretary-general's 1999 report.
The ICJ adopted the Brdanin trial chamber's findings that
"there was willful damage done to both Muslim and Roman
Catholic religious buildings and institutions in the relevant mu-
nicipalities by Bosnian Serb forces," '' and referred to an exhibit
prepared by Andrdis Riedlmayer for the Miloevie case describing
his assessment of 392 cultural and religious sites.'1 2 In deciding
how such evidence of cultural destruction could be appropri-
ately used, the ICJ:
[E]ndorse[d] the observation made in the Krsti( case that
"where there is physical or biological destruction there are
often simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious prop-
erty and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks which
may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to
physically destroy the group.' 83
7. Sentencing Judgments Following a Guilty Plea
The ICJ considered what weight to accord sentencing judg-
ments issued after an accused pled guilty and admitted to some
of the crimes contained in the indictment. The ICJ described
cide has been satisfied."). With respect to conditions at the Luka camp, the Court re-
fers to a section of the Milogevie Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal in sup-
port of its findings. "The conditions and treatment to which the detainees at Luka
Camp were subjected were terrible and included regular beatings, rapes and killings."
Id. 273 (referring to Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion
forJudgment of Acquittal, 159 (June 16, 2004)).
179. The Court relied on the findings of the Simie trial chamber in assessing the
claims of a violation of Article 11(c) in Bosanski Samac.
180. ICJ Geneocide Judgment, supra note 2, 306 (referring to Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment, 7 574, 592 (Feb. 22, 2001)).
181. Id. 336 (quoting Prosecutor v. Brdtanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment,
640 (Sept. 1, 2004)).
182. See id. 1 339.
183. Id. 344 (quoting Prosecutor v. Krstie, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, 1 580 (Aug. 2, 2001)).
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how ICTY procedures require the trial chamber to determine
whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support a conviction
for a crime and also whether admissions made by the accused, as
well as the plea itself, were voluntary, unequivocal, and fully in-
formed. The ICJ found these pleas were sufficiently reliable
when accompanied by a statement of agreed facts and that the
sentencing judgment "may when relevant be given a certain
weight."1" 4 In some cases, the ICJ looked to the sentencing judg-
ments and adopted discrete facts admitted by the accused dur-
ing the plea process. With respect to the Sugica camp outside
Vlasenica, the ICJ adopted the Nikolie trial chamber's finding
that "the Accused [Dragan Nikoli] persecuted Muslim and
other non-Serb detainees by subjecting them to murders, rapes
and torture as charged specifically in the Indictment. "185 With
respect to its assessment of Bosnia's claim that the Serb prisoner
camp at Manjaca was in violation of Article 11(c) of the Genocide
Convention, the ICJ adopted some of the factual findings con-
tained in the Plavgie sentencing judgment.16
8. ICTY Indictments
Bosnia sought to rely on ICTY-related material other than
judgments of the trial and appeals chambers. These materials
included indictments issued by the Office of the Prosecutor, vari-
ous decisions by the trial and appeals chambers, and individual
exhibits and testimony. The ICJ decided to place weight on
some of these materials and summarily reject the evidenciary
value of others.
In its submissions to the ICJ, Bosnia relied, in part, on in-
dictments issued by the ICTY prosecutor. Rule 47 of the ICTY's
Rules of Procedure and Evidence states, in relevant part: "Every
indictment drafted by the Prosecutor must be reviewed by a
judge who examines the allegations contained in the indictment
and reviews the evidence the prosecutor submits in support of it
to ensure that each allegation is adequately supported with prima
184. Id. 224.
185. Id. 252 (quoting Prosecutor v. Nikolit, Case No. IT-94-2-S, SentencingJudg-
ment, 67 (Dec. 18, 2003)). The Court also relied on the Nikolid sentencing judgment
in its evaluation of Bosnia's claims with respect to violations of Article 11(c) of the Geno-
cide Convention. See id. 346.
186. See id. 351 (citing Prosecutor v. Krstie, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 48
(Aug. 2, 2001)).
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facie evidence." '187 One may well argue that some weight should
be given to allegations that are drafted by an independent prose-
cutor and then submitted for review by an independent judge
who determines that there is prima facie evidence supporting
those allegations. Nevertheless, the ICJ is clear that it considers
the lack of the accused's participation to be a fundamental ob-
stacle to giving indictments any evidentiary weight."8 8 The ICJ
rejected Bosnia's reliance on indictments and accorded the alle-
gations contained in them no weight, characterizing them as "al-
legations made by one party." ' 9 The ICJ noted that after an
ICTY indictment is confirmed, the prosecution may decide to
withdraw genocide charges or the charge may be dismissed at
trial, and that "as a general proposition the inclusion of charges
in an indictment cannot be given weight."19 While the ICJ thus
declined to give any evidentiary weight to the charges included
in indictments, it did consider significant the prosecutor's deci-
sion not to include the charge of genocide in several indict-
ments, such as the Stanifie and Perifig indictments.191 Drawing
inferences from the prosecutor's exercise of discretion is a seri-
ous methodological flaw, however, absent some clear authorita-
tive statement by the prosecutor why she exercised her discre-
tion in a particular way. Article 16 of the ICTY's Statute estab-
lishes the Office of the Prosecutor as an independent arm with
broad discretionary power to make determinations regarding
187. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 138.
188. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 218.
189. Id. 217. Article 19(1) of the ICTY's Statute provides: "The judge of the
Trial Chamber to whom the indictment has been transmitted shall review it. If satisfied
that a prima facie case has been established by the Prosecutor, he shall confirm the
indictment. If not so satisfied, the indictment shall be dismissed." ICTY Statute, supra
note 21, art. 19(1). Rule 47(B) of the ICTYs Rules of Procedure and Evidence pro-
vides: "The Prosecutor, if satisfied in the course of an investigation that there is suffi-
cient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has commit-
ted a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, shall prepare and forward to the
Registrar an indictment for confirmation by a Judge, together with supporting mate-
rial." ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 138. Rule 47(E) provides:
"The reviewing Judge shall examine each of the counts in the indictment, and any
supporting materials the Prosecutor may provide, to determine, applying the standard
set forth in Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Statute, whether a case exists against the
suspect." Id.
190. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 217.
191. See id. ("What may however be significant is the decision of the Prosecutor,
either initially or in an amendment to an indictment, not to include or to exclude a
charge of genocide.").
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who to charge and what crimes they should be charged with.
Unlike many continental systems the prosecutor is not required
to submit all charges that are supported by prima facie evidence.
The prosecutor is within the proper exercise of her authority to
make charging decisions on such varied grounds as her assess-
ment of the evidence in her possession and the efficient use of
limited resources. These concerns are especially important in
the case of genocide, where the evidentiary burden upon the
prosecutor is so great that she may need to limit charges in an
indictment in order to strike a balance between appropriately
reflecting the gravity of the accused's conduct and meeting time-
lines set by the Security Council (or avoiding criticism that the
individual cases, take too long). 92
The ICJ cites several examples in which it draws inferences
from the prosecutor's decisions not to include genocide in par-
ticular indictments. But such inferences are necessarily specula-
tive and unreliable. An examination of the indictment against
Momdilo Perigi6, former head of the Yugoslav Army, reveals that
the Peris i6 case is primarily a case of command responsibility and
rests largely on the theory that Perigit was responsible for the
crimes in Srebrenica because of his position of authority over
the troops that directly engaged in the crimes. The indictment
against Perigit alleged that he failed to punish Mladit and other
soldiers under his effective control after learning about their
genocidal acts in Srebrenica. Under the ICTY's jurisprudence,
PerigiCs command responsibility arises not out of his direct or
indirect participation in the crime, but out of his failure to pre-
vent or punish those persons over whom he exercised effective
control and who themselves engaged in criminal activity. This
doctrine of command responsibility does not impute the crimi-
nal intent of the subordinate, but instead punishes the inten-
tional failure to punish subordinates who commit crimes.19 3 The
192. See generally Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 541 (2004) (criticizing the high cost of international criminal trials).
193. Command responsibility "mak[es] the commander guilty for failing in his su-
pervisory capacity to take the necessary corrective action after he knows or has reason to
know that his subordinate was about to commit the act or had done so." Prosecutor v.
Hadiihasanovit, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challeng-
ing Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 32 (July 16, 2003) (J.
Shahabuddeen, partially dissenting).
Command or superior responsibility pursuant to Articles 7(3) and 6(3) of the
Statutes is not a form of vicarious responsibility, nor is it direct responsibility
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prosecution's theory of Perigic's criminal liability for Srebrenica
therefore does not require that he possessed genocidal intent
himself or directly participated in the crimes at Srebrenica.
Since no accused has yet been found guilty of genocide based
solely on command responsibility, a case seeking to assert such a
theory would be controversial and generate protracted litigation.
The ICJ, by attributing weight to the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, assumed without foundation that the
underlying rationale was based on evidentiary considerations re-
lated to the strength of the case and was therefore relevant to
the ICJ's own inquiry. Absent a clear statement of reasons by the
prosecutor, there are many reasons why a prosecutor might em-
ploy her discretion to not charge genocide; drawing conclusions
from these charging decisions is an uncertain endeavor. The
ICJ, by assuming the issues involved in prosecuting a genocide
charge against Perigie were essentially equivalent to those
presented by Bosnia's case before the ICJ, ran the risk of radi-
cally misinterpreting the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
before the ICTY. 9 4 Should a final judgment in the Perifie case
determine that some of the direct perpetrators of Srebrenica
were PerigiC's subordinates (and thus meet the ICJ's test of at-
tributability), then that result, coupled with findings in the Krstie
and Blagojevi cases that the direct perpetrators harbored genoci-
dal intent, would cast doubt on the accuracy of the ICJ Genocide
for the acts of subordinates. Neither is it helpful to refer to it as a form of
responsibility for "negligence" as this is likely to lead to confusion of thought.
Command responsibility, pursuant to Articles 7(3) and 6(3) of the Statutes, is
responsibility for the commander's own acts or omissions in failing to prevent
or punish the crimes of his subordinates whom he knew or had reason to
know were about to commit serious crimes or had already done so.
METrRAUX, supra note 11, at 297 (citations omitted); see also Allison Marston Danner &
Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and
the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75 (2005).
194. The Tribunal only hasjurisdiction tojudge the individual criminal liabil-
ity of particular persons accused before it, and the relevant evidence will there-
fore be limited to the sphere of operations of the accused. In addition,
prosecutorial conduct is often based on expediency and therefore no conclu-
sions can be drawn from the prosecution's acceptance of a plea bargain or
failure to charge a particular person with genocide. While the Court is intent
on adopting the burden of proof relevant to criminal trials, it is not willing to
recognize that there is a fundamental distinction between a single person's
criminal trial-and a case involving State responsibility for genocide.
ICJ Genocide Judgment (Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President A-Khasawneh), supra
note 32, 42.
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Judgment.19 5 It is noteworthy that on at least one occasion, a trial
chamber suggested (without success) that the prosecutor amend
the original indictment to include a charge of genocide: after
reviewing the evidence during a Rule 61 hearing (for more on
such hearings, see below) in the Nikoie case (the prosecutor's
first confirmed indictment), the trial chamber asked the prose-
cutor to consider including the charge of genocide.' 96 The pros-
ecutor's refusal, despite the evidence as reviewed by the trial
chamber, indicates the complexity of decisions as to which
charges should be included in indictments.
The more detailed process of reviewing an indictment
under Rule 61 of the ICTYs Rules of Procedure and Evidence
also came under ICJ scrutiny. In the ICTY's early years, before
the list of pretrial detainees grew, the ICTY employed an addi-
tional procedure for the review of some indictments. This Rule
61 procedure requires the prosecution to produce evidence in
court to support the indictment and to enable the trial chamber
to determine if there are reasonable grounds to believe the ac-
cused committed the crimes contained in the indictment. The
most notable of these hearings were in the Karadi and Mladie
cases, during which the trial chamber heard considerable evi-
dence regarding the events in Srebrenica. Although the ICJ rec-
ognized that judges were actively involved in this process and
that the prosecution called live witnesses, it declined to give
these Rule 61 hearings evidentiary consideration because of the
absence of the accused and also because of the lesser standard of
proof employed in the hearings-namely, that "reasonable
grounds exist for belief that the accused has committed crimes
charged."' 7
Despite its general position on Rule 61 hearings, the ICJ re-
lied on the findings of two such hearings: the one in Nikolie,
195. But crucial trials are outstanding or still in process . . . . Above all,
Momcilo Perisic-Milosevic's most senior general-is also due for trial. It is a
critical case, because a conviction would establish Serbia's direct involvement
in the genocide, in stark counterpoint to a ruling by the International Court
ofJustice, which rejected a case by the Bosnian government against Serbia for
its involvement in genocide.
Ed Vulliamy, War Crime Lawyers Fight UN on Top Job, THE OBSERVER, Sept. 23, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/yugo/article/0,,2175184,00.html.
196. See Prosecutor v. Nikolit, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Review of Indictment Pursu-
ant to Rule 61, 34 (Oct. 20, 1995).
197. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 1 218.
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concerning the sexual and other mistreatment of women at the
Sugica camp and its environs, 9 " and the ones in Karad&iW and
Mladic, concerning the expulsion of civilians from large regions
in Bosnia' 99 and the destruction of cultural and religious heri-
tage in the Banja Luka area.2 °°
9. Trial Chamber's Decision on an Accused's Motion for
Acquittal at the End of the Prosecution Case
The ICJ considered what weight, if any, it could give to a
trial chamber's decision on a motion for acquittal at the end of
the prosecution case pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the ICTY's Rules
of Procedure and Evidence. A "98 bis motion" is roughly
equivalent to that made in common-law criminal trials at the end
of the prosecution case-sometimes referred to as the "no case
to answer motion." Traditional common-law criminal procedure
entitles a defendant to a decision on whether, as a matter of law,
the prosecution has presented a legally sufficient case that the
defendant may then choose to answer by presenting evidence or
argument. The underlying rationale is that in view of the prose-
cution's burden of proof and the high standard of proof of crim-
inal trials, if there is insufficient evidence for a jury to convict at
the conclusion of the prosecution case, the defendant should
not have to defend himself and risk conviction based upon the
jury's perception of the defense's case. The court must make
some assessment of reasonable inferences and facts that can be
deduced from the evidence-which requires the court to tread
the somewhat elusive line between the respective roles of the
judge and fact finder, the jury.20 1 In the judge-only trials of the
198. See id. 308.
199. See id. 332 (quoting Prosecutor v. Karad2i & Mladi6, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61
& IT-95-18-R61, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence, 216 (July 11, 1996)).
200. See id. 1 336.
201. See R. v. Galbraith, (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 124, at 125, 127.
(1) If there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by the
defendant, there is no difficulty. The judge will of course stop the case. (2)
The difficulty arises where there is some evidence but it is of a tenuous charac-
ter, for example because of inherent weakness or vagueness or because it is
inconsistent with other evidence. (a) Where the judge comes to the conclu-
sion that the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a jury
properly directed could not properly convict upon it, it is his duty, upon a
submission being made, to stop the case. (b) Where however the prosecution
evidence is such that its strength or weakness depends on the view to be taken
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ICTY, the motion has served more as a tool of trial management,
one that allows the chamber to "prune" cases (historically, quite
large) by identifying those portions of the indictment that are
not sufficiently supported by evidence to demand a response by
the accused.
The applicable standard of proof for a 98 bis decision is that
the trial chamber must grant the motion wherever a reasonable
trier of fact could not base a conviction on the evidence
presented; conversely, the motion must be denied where there is
sufficient evidence upon which a trial chamber could enter a
conviction. The critical idea here is that the chamber could con-
vict, not that it would convict. A chamber's decision at this stage
does not determine its final judgment, and it is theoretically pos-
sible that for the chamber to deny the motion, for the accused to
present no evidence, and for the chamber still to find the ac-
cused not guilty. In this context the ICJ notes that the Krajignik
case was one in which the trial chamber acquitted the accused of
genocide after having dismissed his midtrial motion for acquit-
tal.20 2 The ICJ considered this difference in standard of proof as
incompatible with the standard of "fully conclusive" that the ICJ
deemed appropriate for its judgment." 3 The ICJ stated that it
could not give weight to any of the rulings arising out of those
motions, " [b]ecause the judge or the Chamber does not make
definitive findings at any of the four stages described .... The
standard of proof which the court requires in this case would not
be met."20 4 Despite this language, the ICJ cites findings made by
the Milokevie trial chamber in its 98 bis decision in support of two
conclusions that it reached on matters not directly related to the
of a witness's reliability, or other matters which are generally speaking within
the province of the jury and where on one possible view of the facts there is
evidence upon which a jury could properly come to the conclusion that the
defendant is guilty, then the judge should allow the matter to be tried by the
jury.
Id. at 127.
202. ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 219 (referring to Prosecutor v. Kraji§-
nik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, 867-69 (Aug. 2, 2001) and transcript of August
19, 2005 at 17112-32).
203. See id. 209 (asserting the "fully conclusive" evidentiary standard).
204. Id. 1 219. It is not clear from the language of the judgment what view the
Court would have taken of the evidentiary weight where a 98 bis motion was granted.
The granting of the motion is equivalent, in effect, to an acquittal after trial and would
appear to be worthy of careful consideration in the Court's judgment.
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central question of dolus specialis.2 °5
The ICJ's decision not to rely (at least in general) on 98 bis
decisions was of some significance because it would influence
the ICJ's handling of the 98 bis decision of June 16, 2004, in the
Milo~evie case-the case that most closely paralleled, and argua-
bly had the most relevance to, the ICJ case. MilogeviC was presi-
dent of Serbia from 1990 to 1997 and of the FRY from 1997 to
2000.2o 6 Given that Milogevie- had been charged before the ICTY
with the crime of genocide in Bosnia, there is much common
ground between the Miloevie indictment and Bosnia's applica-
tion before the ICJ. The ICJ was well aware of the relevance of
MilogeviCs state of mind. As president of the respondent coun-
try during the relevant period, the question of whether he pos-
sessed the dolus specialis of genocide was perhaps the central
question of the ICJ's inquiry. In view of the ICJ's demonstrable
reliance on ICTY jurisprudence, it is certain that the ICJ would
have placed similar reliance on a final judgment in the Milo~evie
case if his death had not terminated the proceedings. Had
Milogevi6 been acquitted of genocide, it would have been diffi-
cult for the ICJ to enter a finding that Serbia, as a state, was
liable for genocide. More generally, it is likely that a final deter-
mination concerning his individual responsibility would have
been largely dispositive of the primary issues before the ICJ.
Moreover, although the ICJ stated that it would not place any
weight on the Miloevie 98 bis Decision, had the Miloevi* trial
chamber dismissed the genocide charge in that decision, it
would have been reasonable for the ICJ to have relied on the
underlying findings.
MilogeviCs participation in the conflict in Bosnia, as well as
his state of mind accompanying that participation, could well
have been dispositive of many of the issues the ICJ faced. Unfor-
tunately, his untimely death before the trial's conclusion not
only denied the international community a judgment in the
case, it also denied the ICJ the benefit of a reasoned opinion by
205. The Court relied on the Miloevie 98 bis Decision for findings related to the
Luka Camp. See id. 1 273 (referring to Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T,
Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, it 159, 160-68 (June 16, 2004)). The
Court also relied, in part, on this decision for its findings regarding Manjaea Camp. See
id. 1 315.
206. See Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Indictment, 77 3, 4 (Nov. 22,
2001).
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the ICTY trial chamber responsible for evaluating the evidence.
Nevertheless, given the parity between the central issues of the
Milogevi case and the ICJ GenocideJudgment, the ICTY trial cham-
ber's Milogevie 98 bis decision merits close attention for what it
says about the evidence of genocide and the relationship of Ser-
bia to the crimes committed in Bosnia.
Rule 98 bis has undergone several significant amendments
to its procedural methodology and has evolved, through the
ICTY's jurisprudence, into a clear and useful procedural mile-
stone.2 °7 The standard of proof applicable to the ICTY's 98 bis
determinations was first set forth in the Delalie case, one of the
ICTY's earliest trials. The appeals chamber in that case stated,
"The test applied is whether there is evidence (if accepted) upon
which a reasonable tribunal of fact could be satisfied beyond rea-
sonable doubt of the guilt of the accused on the particular
charge in question. '20 8 The Kunarac trial chamber put this stan-
dard as the "prosecution needs only to show that there is evi-
dence upon which a reasonable tribunal of fact could convict,
not that the Trial Chamber itself should convict. 2 9
MilogeviC, consistent with his position since his arraignment
that the ICTY itself was not legitimately constituted, declined to
make this motion himself; the amici curiae were consequently
directed by the chamber to make it on his behalf. The chamber
207. Rule 98 bis in its current formulation provides: "At the close of the Prosecu-
tor's case, the Trial Chamber shall, by oral decision and after hearing the oral submis-
sions of the parties, enter ajudgement of acquittal on any count if there is no evidence
capable of supporting a conviction." ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note
138. The rule underwent a significant amendment on December 8, 2004. The previous
version of the rule (and version that applied to the Miloevi case) required that this
determination by the Tribunal be done in writing and upon written motion of the par-
ties. It provided:
(A) An accused may file a motion for the entry ofjudgement of acquittal on
one or more offences charged in the indictment within seven days after the
close of the Prosecutor's case and, in any event, prior to the presentation of
evidence by the defence pursuant to Rule 85 (A) (ii). (B) The Trial Chamber
shall order the entry of judgement of acquittal on motion of an accused or
proprio motu if it finds that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction
on that or those charges.
See Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Decision of Defence Motions for Ac-
quittal, n.3 (Dec. 15, 2000).
208. Prosecutor v. Delalik, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 434 (Feb. 20, 2001).
209. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Decision on Mo-
tion for Acquittal, 1 10 (July 3, 2000).
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summarized the amici's motion with respect to the genocide
charge as follows:
There is no evidence that the Accused planned, instigated,
ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation, or execution of a genocide or any
genocidal acts, or that he was complicit in such, and that the
mens rea requirement for establishing the crime of genocide is
incompatible with the mens rea requirement for the third cate-
gory of a joint criminal enterprise and command responsibil-
ity, as alleged in the Bosnia Indictment.2 1 °
The amici (like the respondent before the ICJ) asserted as their
primary argument that the prosecution had failed to establish
the dolus specialis of genocide. 21' The trial chamber, in light of
the indictment and the procedural history of the Bosnia indict-
ment against Milogevie, confined its deliberations on the 98 bis
motion to nine Bosnian municipalities.2 1 2
The chamber presented its analysis in relation to five dis-
tinct questions:
1. Was there evidence supporting a finding that a Trial
Chamber could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
Milogevi6 was a member of a joint criminal enterprise that
had the aim and intention of destroying in whole or in
part Bosnian Muslims as a group?
2. Could a Trial Chamber be satisfied to the appropriate
standard that Milogevit was a member of a joint criminal
enterprise with the aim and intention to commit crimes
other than genocide but for which genocide was a reasona-
bly foreseeable consequence of that joint criminal enter-
prise?
210. Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judg-
ment of Acquittal, 5 (June 16, 2004) (summarizing Amici Curiae Motion for Judg-
ment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis 1 161-62).
211. The amici curiae asserted the following:
(1) There is no evidence that the Accused possessed the "special intent" re-
quired to commit the crime of genocide. (2) There has been no evidence of
acts and/or conduct of the Accused which could be interpreted as declara-
tions of an intention to commit genocide. (3) The crimes in Schedules A, B
and C of the Bosnia Indictment, if proved, do not provide evidence of the
specific intent for the crime of genocide by their scale or context, which was
primarily territorial in nature.
Prosecutor v. Milogevie, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Ac-
quittal, 1 117 (June 16, 2004).
212. These municipalities were Brtko, Prijedor, Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Kotor Varos,
Kljut, Sangki Most, and Boganski Novi. See id. 1 138.
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3. Could a Trial chamber be satisfied to the appropriate stan-
dard that MilogeviC aided or abetted the crime of geno-
cide?
4. Could a Trial Chamber be satisfied that Milogevie was com-
plicit in the commission of the crime of genocide?
5. Could a Trial Chamber be satisfied that Milogevie knew or
had reason to know that subordinates of his were about to
commit or had committed the crime of genocide and he
failed to take appropriate measures to prevent the geno-
cide or to punish the perpetrators thereof?"21
In denying the motion the trial chamber found:
On the basis of the inference that may be drawn from this
evidence, a Trial Chamber could be satisfied beyond reasona-
ble doubt that there existed ajoint criminal enterprise, which
included members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, whose aim
and intention was to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim
population, and that genocide was in fact committed in
Brcko, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Kljue and
Bosanski Novi. The genocidal intent of the Bosnian Serb
leadership can be inferred from all the evidence .... The
scale and pattern of the attacks, their intensity, the substantial
number of Muslims killed in the seven municipalities, the de-
tention of Muslims, their brutal treatment in detention cen-
tres and elsewhere, and the targeting of persons essential to
the survival of the Muslims as a group are all factors that
point to genocide.
2 1 4
The trial chamber also determined, after evaluating the evi-
dence related to Kotor Varos, that there was insufficient evi-
dence of genocide there.21 5
In analyzing the prosecution's case, the trial chamber fo-
cused first on evidence indicating that Milogevit was "The
Leader of All Serbs," including those in Serbia proper and those
in Bosnia and Croatia.2 16 The chamber concluded that the "Ac-
cused was the dominant political figure in Serbia and he had
213. See id. 1 141.
214. Id. 1 246.
215. See id. 247. Although the chamber went on to note that the number of
killings and other criminal acts directed at the Muslim populations of Bijejina, Klju6,
and Bosanski Novi was lower than the other four regions in which genocide was alleged,
it concluded, based on the geographic and temporal relationship of those municipali-
ties to the other four, that there was sufficient evidence of genocidal intent. See id.
248.
216. Id., 248.
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profound influence over the Bosnian Serb political and military
authorities."217 In support of this conclusion, the chamber re-
ferred to the testimony of Milan Babi, the president of the Ser-
bian Krajina, who was alleged to have been a member of the
joint criminal enterprise with Milogevi; 218 of BorislavJovi , one
of MilogeviC's closest political allies in the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia, who testified that "[t]his period of our history was
marked, without any doubt, by [the Accused]. In every sense, he
was the key figure, the main actor in this Serbian tragedy;" '219
and of Peter Galbraith, the American ambassador to Croatia,
who believed Milogevit was "the architect of a policy of creating
Greater Serbia [the goal to unite Serbs living throughout several
states of the former Yugoslavia into a single enlarged Serb
state] ."220
The trial chamber also considered evidence of Milogevi6's
own public statements and actions. As recalled by the chamber,
Milogevit stated on January 15, 1991, that any dissolution of Yu-
goslavia that resulted in Serbs living outside a unified state was
unacceptable. 22 1  Shortly thereafter, on March 16-months
before the outbreak of the conflict in Bosnia-MilogeviC publicly
urged Serbs throughout the former Yugoslavia to unite, and or-
dered the mobilization of special police forces to defend the in-
terests of Serbs living outside Serbia-an unequivocal admission
that forces under his control and authority were sent into Bos-
nia.222 In the same month, at a secret meeting in Karadjordjevo,
Milogevit and Tuctman, the president of Croatia, agreed to di-
217. Id., 257.
218. Milan Babit was named as a member of the joint criminal enterprise in the
Miloevi indictment. After pleading guilty to crimes against humanity, he testified in
the MilogeuiW case as well as in other ICTY cases. See Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-
02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment, 7 (July 28, 2004).
219. Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judg-
ment of Acquittal, 256 Uune 16, 2004).
220. Id. 249 (quoting testimony of Ambassador Galbraith).
221. See id. 251.
222. See id. 250. In paragraph 389 of the ICJ Genocide Judgment, the Court
considered whether the Scorpions who were captured on video executing six men and
boys from Srebrenica were a dejure organ of the State. The court noted that:
Applicant has claimed that incorporation occurred by a decree of 1991 (which
has not been produced as an Annex) .... The Court observes that, while the
single State of Yugoslavia was disintegrating at that time, it is the status of the
"Scorpions" in mid-1995 that is of relevance to the present case.
ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 389.
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vide Bosnia along ethnic lines and to annex large portions of it
to Croatia and Serbia, creating the possibility that Muslims could
live in an enclave between them.2 2 3 In July 1991, Babie,
Karad~ie;, and Milogevi6 had a conversation in which Karad~i6
claimed he would chase Muslims into the river valleys in order to
link up Serbs living in Bosnia. 224 The chamber relied on the
evidence of Hrvoje Sarinic (senior politician and aide of
Tudman) that on November 12, 1992, Milogevit told him, "I am
telling you frankly that with Republika Srpska in Bosnia, which
will sooner or later become part of Serbia, I have resolved ninety
percent of Serbia's national question." 225  In this context,
Milogevi6 manipulated the Serbian media to further nationalist
interests with propaganda, severely limiting independent media
outlets.
22 6
The trial chamber also took into account the testimony of
two U.N. officials. David Harland, the U.N. civil and political
affairs officer in Sarajevo, and Charles Kirudja, a delegate of the
special representative of the U.N. secretary-general in Belgrade
(who, in this capacity, had approximately six meetings with
Milogevi6). Between 1993 and 1999, as established through
Harlan's evidence, Serbia provided an uninterrupted, base level
of support to Bosnian Serbs, including the Bosnian Serb
Army.227 Kirudja was struck by MilogeviC's command of the detail
and knowledge of the matters discussed at their meetings.
There was no need to meet with the FRY President at the time
Zoran Lili -it was necessary only to meet with Milogevi 2 21
Kirudja referred to a report that he wrote on May 16, 1995, re-
cording his contemporaneous impression that Milogevi6 played a
"solo role in the negotiations" sponsored by the U.N. in an at-
tempt to end the conflict.229 Harland testified that when U.N.
representatives found themselves at an impasse in their direct
negotiations with Bosnian Serb leaders, they would go to Bel-
grade to negotiate directly with Milogevit, who could bring about
223. Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judg-
ment of Acquittal, 1 252 (June 16, 2004).
224. Id. 253.
225. Id. 254.
226. Id. 255.
227. See id. 258.
228. See id. 278.
229. Id.
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results in Bosnia.230 At the meeting called on April 22, 1994 to
deal with an impending crisis in Goraide, Milogevi6, in the pres-
ence of U.N. officials, directed KaradMC to remove obstacles that
had been placed in front of a U.N. humanitarian aid convoy in
Rogatica; KaradM complied, and the obstacles were removed.23 1
The chamber referred to General Wesley Clark's testimony
that during a meeting that he and Ambassador Richard Hol-
brooke had with MilogeviC, Holbrook asked Milogevit whether
he should deal with him or directly with the Bosnian Serb lead-
ers. MilogeviC replied, "with [me] of course. 2 3 2 During other
negotiations Milogevi6 mapped out his preferred way of imple-
menting an agreement that he unilaterally made with the dele-
gation-namely, to present the agreement as a referendum in
Serbia proper. When they asked MilogeviC why he would call a
referendum in Serbia proper to vote on an agreement pertain-
ing to Bosnia, Milogevi6 stated that Bosnian Serbs would obey
the will of the Serb people.233 General Clark also noted that dur-
ing the Dayton peace talks Milogevi6 and he reviewed computer-
ized topographical maps of Bosnia while negotiating territorial
boundaries in Bosnia. Clark testified that MilogeviC had an inti-
mate knowledge of all the contested areas in Bosnia and was -able
to make binding commitments regarding Bosnian territory uni-
laterally and without consultation with the Bosnian Serb repre-
sentatives.234 When Clark was having difficulty getting the Bos-
nian Serb delegates to sign schedules and subsidiary agreements,
Milogevi6 told him that his initials were sufficient to bind the
Serb side, and he went on to promise that he would obtain the
signatures of the other delegates later.235
In finding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a
trial chamber could convict Milogevi6 of genocide, the trial
chamber also reviewed evidence illuminating the close relation-
ship between the Yugoslav and the Bosnian Serb armies. The
trial chamber referred to evidence that the "Bosnian Serb mili-
tary emphasized that the chain of command really ran to Bel-
230. See id. 274.
231. See id. 276.
232. Id. 279 (quoting General Wesley Clark).
233. Id.
234. See id. 282.
235. See id. 283.
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grade. ' 236 The chamber recalled the testimony of General Phil-
lipe Morrillon, commander of U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia, that
he "was absolutely convinced that Belgrade continued to exer-
cise its authority on Ratko Mladi. ''237 The chamber referred to
a cease-fire agreement brokered by Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance and Lord Carrington. The agreement, entitled "Cessa-
tion of Hostilities Agreement," called for an end to hostilities in
Croatia and was signed by MilogeviC in November 1991. Ambas-
sador Herbert Okun, who participated in the negotiations that
led to this cease-fire and witnessed the signing, recalled that the
international negotiators understood MilogeviC to have sufficient
authority and control over paramilitary forces and irregular
troops to be able to enforce his promise that they would cease
hostile activities. Okun relayed how Milogevi6, true to his word
and signature, was able to bring a halt to hostile acts by Serb
paramilitary and irregular units and that such cessation lasted
for some period of time afterward.238
The Miloevi( trial chamber also relied on evidence of the
logistical and material support that Serbia provided the Bosnian
Serbs. A report dated September 1992, signed by Mladie, re-
counted how the Yugoslav Army, when it officially withdrew from
Bosnia in the spring of 1992, left Bosnia Serbs with an essentially
complete army fully staffed and fully equipped. 23 9 The chamber
referred to the recorded minutes of the fiftieth session of the
Republika Srpska assembly held in April 1995, just three months
before the massacre in Srebrenica. In that session, Mladi re-
ported that over the course of the conflict, 89.4% of the 9185
tons of infantry ammunition consumed by the Bosnian Serb
army, 34.4% of the 18,151 tons of artillery ammunition, and
52.4% of the 1336 tons of anti-aircraft ammunition was provided
by the Yugoslav army.2 4 ° When Milogevi6 commented on the
level of support provided the Bosnian Serbs at the Third Con-
gress in 1996, he stated:
As regards the resources spent for weapons, ammunition and
other needs of the Army of Republika Srpska and the Republic
236. Id. 258 (quoting David Harland, U.N. Civil Affairs and Political Affairs Of-
ficer in Sarajevo from 1993 until 1999).
237. Id, 268.
238. See id. 1 275.
239. See id. 259.
240. See id. 261.
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of Serbian Krajina, these expenditures constituted a state se-
cret and because of state interests could not be indicated in
the Law on the Budget, which is a public document. The
same applies to the expenditures incurred by providing
equipment.., for the security forces and special anti-terrorist
forces in particular... and this was not made public because
it was a state secret, as was everything else that was provided
for the Army of the Republika Srpska.2 4 1
With respect to cooperation between the Yugoslav and Bos-
nian Serb armies, the trial chamber referred to the testimony of
Dr. Michael Williams, the United Nations Protection Force Di-
rector of Information for Yasushi Akashi, the U.N. special repre-
sentative between 1994 and 1995, and to their conclusion that
Serbs had access to newly improved radar and air defense equip-
ment in Sarajevo and northwestern Bosnia.24 2 The chamber re-
called how Clark relayed to General PerigiC, chief of staff of the
Yugoslav Army, his conclusion that Perigi6 was allowing the Bos-
nian Serb Army to receive radar and air defense information di-
rectly from Yugoslavia's air defense systems, and cautioned him
to disconnect the two air defense systems.243
The trial chamber relied on evidence that until February 28,
2002, the salaries of all officers of the Bosnian Serb army were
paid by the Yugoslav Army through an administrative unit, the
"30th Personnel Centre," established for that purpose. 2 44 The
chamber recounted the testimony of a radar control officer in
the Bosnia Serb Army during the war: he received no compensa-
tion or benefits from the Bosnian Serb Army, but only from the
30th Personnel Centre. 245 This soldier, using the pseudonym B-
127, described how despite his regular presence in Bosnia, the
only identification that he was issued between 1992 and 1995 was
that of an officer of the Yugoslav Army. It was not until after the
Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 that he was first issued a separate
identification card for the Bosnian Serb Army and instructed to
show it to any international forces that requested identifica-
241. Id. 262 (quoting exhibit no. 427, tab 3, at 2 (statement by Milogevie regard-
ing a ruling of District Court in Belgrade on his detention, dated April 2, 2001)).
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. Id. 260.
245. See id.
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246Antestion. Another soldier, who appeared under the pseudonym B-
1804, testified that although he served in Bosnia in a Bosnian
Serb Army unit, he was considered a member of the Yugoslav
Army. The Yugoslav Army paid this soldier and other members
of the unit, provided them with medical care, and made deci-
sions regarding their promotion (upon the recommendation of
their superiors in the Bosnian Serb Army, who themselves were
members of the Yugoslav Army attached to the 30th Personnel
Centre) .247
The trial chamber referred to the prosecution's military ex-
pert, who testified about formal military plans drawn up jointly
by the Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav armies, 24 and provided details
about a resupply operation, known as the "Izvor" plan. The
chamber referred to the evidence of a military analyst who re-
viewed a large number of documents in the prosecution's evi-
dence collection-many documents captured by Bosnian Feder-
ation forces from Bosnian Serb Army command posts. A num-
ber of these documents described a close working relationship
between the two armies. This analyst also pointed to documen-
tary evidence of the Yugoslav Army's direct involvement in the
Bosnia conflict in eastern Bosnia in 1993 and 1995, in Sarajevo
between 1993 and 1994, and in Western Bosnia in 1994.249
One soldier, B-174, from the Yugoslav Army candidly testi-
fied about his direct participation in serious crimes committed
in Bosnia. He described a Yugoslav Army operation in which he
and his unit crossed into Bosnia in January of 1993. Before
crossing the border they were ordered to remove any patches on
their uniforms that would identify them as members of the Yugo-
slav Army, and to replace them with Bosnian Serb Army patches
(which they were given). Once across the border, they were
joined by members of the Yugoslav Army's 63rd Parachute Bri-
gade, and together they launched an attack on the Bosnia Mus-
lim-majority village of Skelane, near Srebrenica. He described in
detail how houses and farms were set on fire to frighten people
from their homes. These people fled into a horseshoe forma-
tion created by the Yugoslav troops just outside the village. As
246. See id. 9 269.
247. See id. 9 264.
248. See id. 270.
249. See id. 99 270-72.
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the frightened people fled into the hollow of the formation B-
174 and his unit opened fire on them with automatic weapons.
He described one particular member of his unit who did what
other Yugoslav soldiers would not-execute the children by slic-
ing their throats with a knife.25 °
In assessing MilogeviCs knowledge of the crimes in Bosnia,
the trial chamber referred to evidence that Milogevie demanded
that he be kept informed of all that was going on.251 The cham-
ber referred to a member of the "Contact Group," who said that
he saw Milogevi6 and Ratko Mladi in Serbia on July 7, 1995, just
before Srebrenica fell. Four days later a code cable to Milogevi
stated that "the [Bosnian Serb Army] is likely to separate the mil-
itary-age men from the rest of the population."2 52 This cable ar-
rived prior to the time that the Krstie appeals chamber deter-
mined that the dolus specialis of genocide was clearly established.
The Milokevie trial chamber recalled the. pointed question that
General Clark put to Milogevi6 regarding why, if he had such
influence over Bosnian Serbs, he allowed Mladie to commit the
crimes he did at Srebrenica. Milogevi6 replied, "Well, General
Clark, I told him not to do it but he didn't listen to me.1"253
Clark recounted how he was stunned by this admission because
it demonstrated Milosevic's foreknowledge of Mladi's plans for
the male Muslim population of Srebrenica.254 After reviewing
the evidence produced at trial, the trial chamber concluded:
[T] hat there is sufficient evidence that genocide was commit-
ted in BrC6ko, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Srebrenica, Bijeljina,
Klju6 and Bosanski Novi and ... that there is sufficient evi-
dence that the Accused [Milogevi6] was a participant in a
joint criminal enterprise, which included the Bosnian Serb
leadership, the aim and intention of which was to destroy a
part of the Bosnian Muslims as a group. 255
While this determination by the trial chamber carries none of
the weight of a final judgment regarding the evidence, it does
indicate that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable trial
chamber to potentially convict Milogevi6 of genocide. Given the
250. See generally id. 263.
251. See id. 285.
252. Id. 284.
253. Id. 280.
254. See id.
255. Id. 1 289.
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similarity between the issues in the Miloevie case and Bosnia's
claim of genocide before the ICJ, this body of evidence had simi-
lar potential for the ICJ case.
For the reasons articulated earlier-specifically, with respect
to the different standards of proof involved-the ICJ decided to
place no reliance on the findings of the Miloevie trial chamber
in its 98 bis decision. 56 However, given the Milogevi6 trial cham-
ber's finding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a
court could find Milogevie guilty of the crime of genocide, and
given the parity between the Miloevid case and the ICJ case, a
thorough inquiry into Bosnia's claims before the ICJ required
the ICJ to examine the evidence referred to in the Miloevie 98
bis decision to adjudicate the case before it.
Since an ICTY trial chamber, after a full hearing of the pros-
ecution evidence and cross-examination by Milogevie, deter-
mined that there was ample evidence upon which a trial cham-
ber could make a finding directly relevant to the ICJ inquiry at a
standard equivalent to the ICJ's articulated standard, the ICJ
should have conducted its own examination of this evidence.
Such a review was all the more compulsory in view of the
Miloevie trial chamber's finding that the evidence could estab-
lish not only that MilogeviC, by himself, could be convicted of the
crime of genocide, but that he was a member of a joint criminal
enterprise comprised of other senior members of the FRY gov-
ernment 257 similarly engaged in genocidal crimes against the
Bosnian Muslim population.
The Milokevi 98 bis decision and the ICJ's failure to evaluate
that body of evidence bring into focus the different strengths
and weaknesses of their respective efforts to enforce the prohibi-
tions of the Genocide Convention. A body of evidence that could
lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the head of state of the respondent had committed
256. Interestingly, the Court does adopt the Milosevie trial chamber's findings re-
garding conditions at the Manjata camp. ICJ Genocide judgment, supra note 2, 315
(quoting Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judg-
ment of Acquittal, 178 (June 16, 2004)).
257. The Milogevie indictment named the following people as members of the joint
criminal enterprise: Radovan Karadi , Momcilo Krajignik, Biljana Plavgi, Ratko
Mladi6, Borisav Jovi6, Branko Kogfit, Veljko Kadijevi , Blagoje Adlik, Milan MartiV,
Jovica Stanisit, Franko SimatoviC, Radovan Stojicic, Vojislav Segelj, and Zeljko
Ra~natovie. See generally Prosecutor v. Milogevit, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Indictment (Nov.
22, 2001).
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the crime of genocide is of major import. Yet the ICTY's efforts
to adjudicate the criminal responsibility of an individual were
thwarted by the untimely death of the accused, and the ICJ's ef-
forts to determine state criminal responsibility were thwarted by
its inability to adjudicate issues of individual criminal responsi-
bility. The world is left without a final adjudication, without a
final judicial assessment of evidence that could support a finding
not only that Milogevie was guilty of genocide but that Serbia
bore criminal responsibility as well. The fact that the ICJ did
not, and perhaps could not, properly assess that body of evi-
dence highlights its limited capacity to adjudicate claims under
the Genocide Convention.
III. INTEGRATING THE MANDATE AND METHODOLOGIES
OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
The Bosnia genocide case was the first time that the ICJ was
called upon to adjudicate a claim under the Genocide Conven-
tion. Although the ICJ had the benefit of the ICTY's parallel
work adjudicating the responsibility of senior individuals, the
work of that tribunal, with the death of MilogeviC, was incom-
plete and left a gap that the ICJ could fill only by engaging in its
own determination of the core factual and legal issues-issues
that the Milogevie trial and appeals chambers would have re-
solved with the precision of a criminal process. Before consider-
ing the relationship between the ICJ and other international
criminal tribunals, it is worth giving separate attention to the
ICJ's legal and practical capacity for adjudicating cases involving
the culpable responsibility of particular individuals.
The ICJ's legal authority to make findings of fact and law
with respect to whether senior political leaders have committed
genocide can arise only from the ICJ's Statute and the referral
clause of the Genocide Convention. The ICJ's interpretation of
the Genocide Convention that a state, as a state, can perpetrate
the crime of genocide is distinct from the question of whether
the ICJ can, in the course of adjudicating state responsibility,
properly make determinations of the individual responsibility of
senior state officials. Article 9 of the Genocide Convention,
which gives the ICJ competence over disputes arising out of the
Genocide Convention, does not explicitly refer to the adjudica-
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tion of criminal responsibility-whether individual or state.2 58
While the Genocide Convention does define the essential ele-
ments of genocide and makes clear that senior political leaders
and constitutional rulers are not immune from prosecution for
genocide,259 it contains no explicit provision for adjudicating the
crime itself and instead leaves to the contracting parties the task
of devising their own mechanisms for prosecuting and punish-
ing those who commit genocide. The Genocide Convention also
leaves it to them to decide how best to incorporate the prohibi-
tions embodied in the Genocide Convention into their national
criminal justice systems (consistent with their own constitu-
tions) .260
It is against this background that the ICJ decided that its
own legal competence included the ability to independently de-
termine issues of individual criminal responsibility in the process
of adjudicating state criminal responsibility. While it recognized
the value of the work conducted by the criminal tribunals, the
ICJ did not acknowledge either a legal or practical dependence
on them. The ICJ, without setting out a legal basis, granted itself
"the capacity" to make "final determinations" of the mens rea of
persons alleged to have committed crimes-a task ordinarily re-
served for criminal courts.26 ' The ICJ itself created this new
competence to engage in a juridical function not expressly or
implicitly provided for in the Genocide Convention.262
258. Article 9 of the Genocide Convention provides:
Disputes between Contracting Parties related to the interpretation, applica-
tion or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated
in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute.
Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 9.
259. Article 4 of the Genocide Convention provides, in full: "Persons committing
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether
they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." Id.
art. 4.
260. Article 5 of the Genocide Convention provides: "The Contracting Parties un-
dertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legis-
lation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enu-
merated in article III." Id. art. 5.
261. See ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 181.
262. Instead, the Court adopted a position according to which it can itself
make a determination as to whether or not genocide was committed without a
distinct decision by a court or tribunal exercising criminal jurisdiction. The
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The Genocide Convention is clear regarding which courts
should be empowered to hear genocide cases. With respect to
establishing criminal culpability, Article 6 provides that individ-
ual criminal responsibility "shall be tried by a competent tribu-
nal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed,
or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction
with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have ac-
cepted its jurisdiction. '"26' The phrase an "international penal
tribunal" is a reference to the work of the International Law
Commission, which at the time was engaged in the task of trying
to establish an international criminal court-an effort that re-
grettably stalled during the Cold War.264 This express referral of
any adjudication of the Genocide Convention's criminal prohibi-
tions to national and international penal courts is an implicit
recognition that the specialized methodology and procedural
protections of penal courts are essential to adjudicating criminal
responsibility for genocide. The referral in Article 9 of the Ge-
nocide Convention to courts other than the ICJ is an express
recognition of the ICJ's inability to properly inquire and adjudi-
cate issues of individual responsibility. 265 It is likely, however,
that the drafters failed to consider that establishing state respon-
sibility for genocide necessarily requires some determination of
whether senior state officials had, as individuals, violated the
Judgment offers no explanation as to the legal basis of this position. Rather
the Court constructs for itself 'the capacity' to do so (Judgment, paragraph
181), which is nowhere to be found in the Genocide Convention.
ICJ Genocide Judgment (Declaration of Judge Skotnikov), supra note 35, at 6.
263. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 6.
The Court simply cannot establish individual responsibility for the crime of
genocide by persons capable of engaging a State's responsibility since it lacks
criminal jurisdiction. In particular, by reason of the lack of criminal jurisdic-
tion, the Court cannot establish the existence or absence of genocidal intent,
since nothing in the Genocide Convention indicates that it deals with genoci-
dal intent in any other sense than it being a requisite part, a mental element,
of the crime of genocide.
ICJ Genocide Judgment (Declaration of Judge Skotnikov), supra note 35, at 6.
264. Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Crimes against the Peace, Feb. 1, 2008, http:/
/www.benferencz.org/arts/4.html.
265. Article 9 of the Genocide Convention states:
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, appli-
cation or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to
the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumer-
ated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at
the request of any of the parties to the dispute.
Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 9.
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prohibitions of the Genocide Convention. And because adjudi-
cating state responsibility for genocide requires adjudicating is-
sues of individual criminal responsibility, and because the ICJ
lacks the capacity to properly adjudicate such issues, the ICJ
would inescapably be drawn into a relationship of dependency
in relation to courts engaged in the adjudication of individual
guilt.
Even if the ICJ's assumption of the difficult task of adjudi-
cating issues of individual criminal responsibility rested on
firmer legal footing than suggested above, its procedures make it
ill suited for the task. The unique procedures of a criminal trial
are designed not only to protect the rights of an individual ac-
cused of a crime, but to define a methodology that has been
historically proven to yield accurate determinations of whether
crimes have been committed. The ICJ's procedures, designed
for a different purpose, are incapable of engaging in such a de-
tailed inquiry or yielding as reliable a result. Having two interna-
tional courts-one designed for resolving interstate disputes and
one designed for adjudication of individual criminal responsibil-
ity-creates the potential that the two courts will reach inconsis-
tent results. Had the ICJ made a determination "beyond doubt"
that Milogevie possessed the dolus specialis of genocide and thus
that Serbia, as a state, has perpetrated the crime of genocide,
those factual/legal determinations would have almost complete
parity with those of the ICTY and would have improperly trans-
gressed upon the competence of that tribunal. Any "final deter-
minations" regarding MilogeviCs mens rea (with respect to the
genocidal acts perpetrated in Bosnia) prior to the final judg-
ment of the Miloevi trial chamber would have created difficul-
ties for the trial chamber; it is likely that the ICJ's would have
conflicted in material ways with the trial chamber's judgment re-
sulting from a more detailed inquiry. And if the judgments of
the ICJ and the trial chamber had been inconsistent on the mat-
ter of Milogevie's commission of genocidal acts, the international
community would rightly have been confused.
The ICJ's serving as a venue for determining criminal re-
sponsibility seems incongruous with the ICJ's inability to initiate
a case absent a formal complaint by a State Party. Consider, hy-
pothetically, that the aggressor state perpetrating the genocide
was completely successful and that the targeted group no longer
existed. If another State Party did not initiate a claim on behalf
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of the targeted group, the ICJ would not have any jurisdiction
itself to initiate a case (before itself) to assess the state's criminal
liability.266 The ICJ, unlike a criminal tribunal with an indepen-
dent prosecutor, could be shackled by its own procedures and be
prevented from embarking on an inquiry into something as im-
portant as allegations that a state is perpetrating the crime of
genocide.
Once the inquiries were initiated before the two courts-
and despite the similarity between the issues that the courts
would face-their inquiries were largely shaped by the differ-
ences in their respective statutes. While the ICTY's statute cre-
ated the office of an independent prosecutor to investigate
claims made by parties on all sides of the conflict, the allegations
before the ICJ were formulated by the parties to the conflict
themselves in their claims and counterclaims. The burden of in-
vestigating and gathering evidence for the ICJ was not under-
taken by a well-resourced independent office of the prosecutor
but left to the two interested parties.
The introduction of evidence in international criminal
tribunals, while under somewhat more liberal rules of evidence
than national systems, is still rigorous compared to the proce-
dures employed by the ICJ.2 67 Despite the ICJ's status as the
"world court," much of its procedure bears an air of informality,
with parties engaging the process in "letters" (versus motions)
culminating in oral hearings that lack many of the procedural
and evidentiary formalities of a criminal trial in the ICTY.2 68
The ICJ does have, at least theoretically, some capacity to
266. Article 36 of the Convention provides, in relevant part: "The jurisdiction of
the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially pro-
vided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force."
Id. art. 36. "The Statute appears to presume that there will be, but not specifically to
require that there should be, at least two parties to a contested proceeding." See C.
WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPEcrs OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 125 (1964); see also
SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 74 (1962).
267. It became apparent early on that it would be difficult if not impossible for
the Court [ICJ] to assert anything approaching stringent rules of evidence
relating to the substance of what was produced, and it has applied practically
no rules of propriety or admissibility in connection with documentary evi-
dence. The absence of rules restricting the length of documents has long been
associated with the perceived freedom of sovereign states to present their cases
before the Court howsoever they see fit.
Highet, supra note 56, at 357.
268. ROSENNE, supra note 66, at 1381.
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secure the evidence necessary to decide issues of criminal culpa-
bility; several articles of the ICJ's statute enable it to obtain evi-
dence for itself. The ICJ has the power to apply directly to gov-
ernments who are not parties to serve notices upon persons in
possession of evidence.269 It can require agents of the parties
before it to produce documentary evidence 270 and can call upon
the parties to produce evidence. 27' The ICJ can propri0 motu visit
locations related to the case in order to obtain evidence itself.27 2
While in theory these provisions give the ICJ some of the mecha-
nisms available to an international prosecutor or international
criminal court to secure evidence, the ICJ's customary practice
has been to exercise these powers infrequently and to depend
upon the parties for the production of evidence.2 73 And while
the ICJ has some authority to secure possession of evidence, it
lacks many of the mechanisms found in national systems. 274
Even if the ICJ and ICTY had equivalent powers to secure
evidence, some commentators have observed that the ICJ has
been reluctant to fully engage in the task of finding facts. 2 7 5
Other commentators have suggested, instead, that the ICJ's ca-
pacity to establish facts is limited by its procedures and meth-
ods.2 76 The ICJ's work has generally not been thereby impeded,
269. See ICTY Statute, supra note 21, art. 44.
270. Id. art. 49.
271. Id. art. 62.
272. Id. art. 66.
273. "The most significant impediment to the ability of the Court to function deci-
sively in evidentiary questions is of course that it possesses no power to order produc-
tion." Highet, supra note 56, at 357.
274. "Similarly, the International Court has none of the powers of an internal
court to obtain evidence through letters rogatory and the like, or any power of sub-
poena, or to order discovery, unless they should be specifically conferred on it."
ROSENNE, supra note 66, at 1345.
275. [Allthough the Court has broad flexibility and wide powers in matters
relating to evidence, it has not in fact used them to their full potential .... If
the litigator's commonplace is correct-that, in the long run, the facts are
always the most important part of any lawsuit-any lack of confidence, result-
ing from reaction (justified or not) to the Nicaragua case, about the Court's
handling of evidence and facts would be serious indeed. If this proves true,
the Court's broad powers, particularly in the area of evidence, may well con-
tinue to remain relatively unused and untested and the promise and power of
the Court will continue to be regrettably untried.
Highet, supra note 56, at 374-75.
276. YetJudge Manley Hudson wrote years ago that: "Issues of fact are seldom
tried before the Court, and where a question of fact arises the Court must
usually base its finding on statements made on behalf of the parties either in
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however, since many of its contentious cases have presented
complex legal questions arising from a relatively simple set of
facts. 2 7 7  In those cases in which factual determinations are
made, they are most often made on the basis of indirect evi-
dence.278 Some commentators have suggested that the ICJ
would benefit from delegating the fact-finding component of its
task to a commission designed for that purpose, thereby limiting
itself to applying the law to the commission's factual findings.279
In her introductory remarks before reading a summary of
the ICJ's judgment in the ICJ Genocide Judgment, the ICJ's presi-
dent, Judge Roslyn Higgins, observed that allegations of geno-
cide necessitated a detailed and challenging factual inquiry by
the ICJ.28 ° In this case it was called upon to consider the state of
the documents of the written proceedings or in the course of oral proceed-
ings."
Id. at 356 (quoting M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
1920-1942, at 565 (1943)).
277. "However, the natural subject-matter of the types of cases which have been
presented before the Court-and the proof of the type of facts which constitute viola-
tions or breaches of international obligations-do not normally require detailed investi-
gation into, or resolution of, difficult questions of fact." Id. at 372.
278. When one considers in particular the various affirmative determination of
fact issues in the Nicaragua case, it is noticeable how few of them were in fact
decided by direct evidence of any kind . . . .This quick overview of factual
findings made in the Nicaragua case suffices to show how substantially the
Court in reality relied upon indirect or inferential methods of proof such as
admissions and failures to make specific denial, public knowledge supported
by governmental publications, or notoriety of press reports which were not
corrected by officials.
Id. at 373-74 (citations omitted).
279. "Other ways of inducing governments to have recourse to adjudication may
exist. One would be to promote the use of fact-finding commissions or commissions of
enquiry confined purer to the facts of a case without entry upon the law." Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, Enlargement of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court, in 2 THE FUTURE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 461, 490 (1976); see also RUDOLPH L. BIND-
SCHEDLER, Report, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 144 (1974) ("[I]t
may be argued that it is preferable to submit a case to a special non-judicial body when
the facts and their elucidation are paramount.").
Finally, the Court could also consider modifying its Rules to provide for spe-
cial masters for findings of fact, in a manner similar to U.S. Supreme Court
practice in instances of its original jurisdiction. This would not be inconsistent
with the Statute and could be based upon the unused provision for assessor
contemplated by the statue and the Rules. Assessors could be combined with
the use of experts (as in Corfu Channel) to effectively "shrink," the Court from
its normally somewhat impressive dimensions and render the consideration of
evidentiary matters more direct, precise, and controlled.
Highet, supra note 56, at 372 (citations omitted).
280. This was an extremely fact-intensive case. The hearings lasted for two-
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mind of senior state officials. Such inquiries are not without pre-
cedent; in the past, the ICJ has had to consider what the inten-
tions of senior state officials were.2 " In such cases, the ICJ
looked to documentary evidence and public statements for evi-
dence of the knowledge and intent of state officials with respect
to boundaries,282 covert military activities,2"3 and the existence of
maritime mines."' In all of these cases, the statements of senior
state officials, while ultimately used to establish findings against
the state, were not clear admissions of criminal responsibility.
The precise and exacting requirements of the dolus specialis of
genocide necessitate unequivocal statements by state officials in-
dicating their genocidal intent. Anything less than a clear une-
quivocal statement, no matter how thinly veiled, would fall short
of what is needed to establish genocidal intent. Although some
state officials have, in the past, been surprisingly forthcoming
about their genocidal intentions, it is unlikely that in our present
world-in which several heads of state and other senior officials
have already been tried before international criminal courts-
they will be so candid about their intentions. 2 ' Absent such an
and-half-months, witnesses were examined and cross-examined, and the Par-
ties each submitted thousands of pages of documentary evidence. About one
third of the Judgment is devoted to analyzing this evidence and making de-
tailed findings as to whether alleged atrocities occurred and, if so, whether
there was the specific intent on the part of the perpetrators to destroy in whole
or in part the protected group, identified by the Court as the Bosnian Mus-
lims. It is this specific intent, or dolus specialis, that distinguishes genocide
from other crimes. In this case, it was not enough for the Applicant to show
that, for example, deliberate unlawful killings of Bosnian Muslims occurred.
Something more was required-proof that the killings were committed with
the intent to destroy the group to which the victims belonged.
Roslyn Higgins, Pres. ICJ, Statement to the Press by H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Presi-
dent of the International Court of Justice, February 26, 2007, http://www.icj-cij.org/
court/index.php?pr=1898&pt=3&pl=l&p2=3&p3=l.
281. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.) 1986 I.CJ. 60 (June 27); Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), Judg-
ment, 1962 I.CJ. 31 (June 15); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 16 (Apr. 9).
282. See Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 31 (June 15).
283. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 60 (June 27).
284. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.CJ. 18 (Apr. 9).
285. Henry Morgenthau Sr., the U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire
(1913-16) recorded the words of Mehmet Talaat Pasha, the Ottoman minister of the
interior (1913-17), referring to the campaign against the Armenians:
"It is no use for you to argue," Talaat answered, "we have already disposed of
three quarters of the Armenians; there are none at all left in Bitlis, Van, and
Erzeroum. The hatred between the Turks and the Armenians is now so in-
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unequivocal public statement that was recorded in a way that
renders its authenticity undisputed, the ICJ, in its effort to estab-
lish the mens rea of a state official, would have to rely on the
testimony of witnesses. The calling of witnesses concerning mat-
ters of fact remains an unusual, though not unprecedented, oc-
currence in ICJ proceedings.286 Even if a sufficient number of
such witnesses were called to testify, they would not be chal-
lenged by the person alleged to have made the statement-
something with significant implications for both the fairness and
the accuracy of the proceedings. Citing the lack of involvement
of the accused, the ICJ has declined to rely on a number of ICTY
proceedings even when there has been significant judicial in-
volvement in the process.
The procedures provided for in the ICJ's statute and rules
are noticeably different from those of a criminal tribunal in that
they lack any of the procedural protections afforded those ac-
cused of crimes-protections that are common to most modern
legal systems. Article 34(1) of the ICJ's statute provides that
"[o]nly states may be parties in cases before the Court." This
article makes clear that individuals whose conduct and mens rea
are adjudicated by the ICJ (with a view toward establishing the
responsibility of states) have no right of appearance before the
ICJ. Those individuals may, indeed, be found to have perpe-
trated the crime of genocide without ever having had the oppor-
tunity to defend themselves against such allegations. It is diffi-
cult to contemplate a way in which the ICJ could fairly deter-
mine that a senior FRY leader participated in the crimes in
Bosnia with the requisite dolus specialis absent a prior determina-
tion of that person's guilt by the ICTY or an opportunity for that
person to appear before the ICJ to defend against such serious
tense that we have got to finish with them. If we don't, they will plan their
revenge.
HENRY MORGENTHAUJR., AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY 337-38 (1918); see also Gary
J. Bass, At Saddam's Trial, the Law Is Just Part of the Picture, WASH. PosT, Jan. 18, 2004, at
B03.
"Very few people in history would say publicly they were about to commit a
genocide," says Dermot Groome, the prosecutor leading the Bosnia genocide
case against Milosevic. Instead, Groome said, prosecutors try to show a pattern
of targeted slaughter, "so that the chamber can infer that the only explanation
for these acts was a genocidal intent."
286. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 127
(1989).
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allegations. The ICTY itself has been reticent in issuing judg-
ments that can be read broadly to implicate persons who were
not before the Tribunal. The Krstie appeals chamber recognized
this problem when it pondered why the trial chamber asserted
that those perpetrating the crimes at Srebrenica possessed geno-
cidal intent, but then failed to identify them. The appeals cham-
ber suggested that the trial chamber recognized the unfairness
of identifying someone in this way outside of a criminal trial and
without an opportunity to confront the evidence.287 If a senior
state official did so choose to meet such allegations against him
or her and was granted an opportunity to do so, the court in
question would be obligated to ensure that the procedural pro-
tections of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and regional human rights instruments were observed.
In undertaking the adjudication of issues of individual crim-
inal responsibility, the ICJ conducted what amounted to a trial in
absentia of senior state officials. While the ICJ cannot deprive
senior state officials of their liberty, a judgment finding that a
senior state official committed the crime of genocide would inva-
riability have a harsh impact on that person. The ICJ-not be-
ing a criminal court but charged with the task of determining
individual responsibility-cannot properly or fairly inquire into
the states of mind of the senior officials whose states of mind
were essential to the ICJ's determination.288 As such, the ICJ can
only conduct its work after issues of their individual responsibil-
ity have been fairly established in a criminal trial. The ICJ
should and must wait until such final judgments are rendered
287. The fact that the Trial Chamber did not attribute genocidal intent to a
particular official within the Main Staff may have been motivated by a desire
not to assign individual culpability to persons not on trial here. This, however,
does not undermine the conclusion that Bosnian Serb forces carried out geno-
cide against the Bosnian Muslims.
Prosecutor v. Krstie, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 35 (Apr. 19, 2004).
288. However, nothing in Article IX suggests that the Court is empowered to
go beyond settling disputes, relating to State responsibility and to actually con-
duct an enquiry and make a determination whether or not the crimes of geno-
cide was committed. The Court simply cannot establish individual responsibil-
ity for the crime of genocide by persons capable of engaging a State's responsi-
bility since it lacks criminal jurisdiction. In particular, by reason of the lack of
criminal jurisdiction, the Court cannot establish the existence or absence of
genocidal intent, since nothing in the Genocide Convention indicates that it
deals with genocidal intent in any other sense than it being a requisite part, a
mental element, of the crime of genocide.
ICJ Genocide Judgment (Declaration of Judge Skotnikov), supra note 35, at 6.
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before it commences its work on the merits. To do otherwise is
to place the work of the ICJ and other international criminal
courts in possible conflict with each other.2
9
Unfortunately, because of the death of Milogevi6, the ICJ
did not have the option of waiting for a judgment in the ICTY's
Miloevi( case. That case was the first and only ICTY case to focus
on the same central question of genocidal intent. The conflict
in the former Yugoslavia was a series of complex crimes commit-
ted in a multitiered environment by multitudes of perpetrators
not always sharing the same intent. In the context of Srebrenica,
many actors contributed to the tragic events there. Against this
sort of factual background, the ICTY has inescapably begun its
work by examining the conduct of the perpetrators most imme-
diately associated with the crimes and then continued upward
toward those most responsible. 29 ° That is, absent documentary
evidence of the type left behind by the Nazis indicating the in-
volvement of senior officials in genocidal acts, prosecutors must
necessarily begin by identifying the direct perpetrators and look
upward on the ladder of ever-increasing responsibility to deter-
mine the identity of the central architects of the crimes. In the
case of Srebrenica, the first ICTY conviction was of Erdemovi ,
who directly participated in the Srebrenica massacre and
manned one of the machine guns outside the town. Building on
what was learned from that case and on continued investiga-
tions, the next set of cases examined the culpability of the com-
manders present in the Srebrenica area: Krstie and Obrenovi(.
Building on the work of those investigations, Milogevie was fi-
nally indicted for the crimes in Srebrenica in 2001, seven years
after the ICTY was established. The Milogevie trial chamber
would have been the first trial chamber to comprehensively ex-
amine the evidence relevant to the allegation that a senior Serb
state official-namely, its president-was a participant in the
crime of genocide. 2 1
289. "This kind of collision of course has not occurred in practice. However, this
does not make the Court's failure to strike a proper balance under the Genocide Con-
vention between the Court's jurisdiction and that of a criminal tribunal any lesser." Id.
at 7.
290. See generally RicHARD GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR
CRIMES PROSECUTOR (2000).
291. The Court recognized this fact:
The Respondent has emphasized that in the final judgments of the Chambers
of the ICTY relation to genocide in Srebrenica, none if its leaders have been
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Perhaps the ICJ had considered waiting until the Milo~evi6
case had reached its conclusion. A survey of the ICTY's cases
reveals that its remaining cases are unlikely to have resulted in
judgments that would have directly addressed the issues ad-
dressed in the ICJ Genocide Judgment. The trial chamber's judg-
ment in the Milo~evie case with respect to the genocide charges
in Bosnia would have been highly relevant and, given the ICJ's
significant reliance on other ICTYjudgments, might well have
been dispositive of the ICJ case. MilogeviC's death and the result-
ing termination of the case foreclosed that possibility. Of the
other senior Yugoslav indictees awaiting trial, General Perigi6
and Jovica StanigiC, neither has been charged with genocide.
Consequently, although the possibility exists that relevant find-
ings of fact will emerge from the judgments in those cases,
neither trial chamber has any obvious reason to deal directly
with the question of the dolus specialis of genocide.
It will prove helpful to return briefly to consider the
Milorevi6 trial chamber 98 bis decision and the evidence it evalu-
ated in the process. Judges making determinations under that
rule do not assess the credibility and reliability of prosecution
witnesses and exhibits. Instead, the judges consider that evi-
dence in a favorable light to the prosecution. While the ICJ
might have had the capacity to review the ICTY's evidence used
to authenticate documentary evidence, witness testimony is dif-
ferent. Judges largely rely on their commonsense impression of
witnesses to determine their credibility. In its 98 bis decision, the
Milogevie trial chamber cited General Clark's recounting of a
conversation with Milogevi6 in which he communicated his own
advance knowledge of the crimes to be committed in Srebrenica.
In its final judgment the trial chamber would have made specific
findings with respect to Clark's credibility and reliability. Is it
possible for the ICJ to reexamine all of the prosecution witnesses
or to view the videotapes of the ICTY trial? This duplicative task
would have consumed a great deal of the ICJ's time. The ICJ's
own rules provide little guidance as to the evaluation of witness
found to have been implicated. The Applicant does not challenge that read-
ing, but makes the point that that issue has not been before the ICTY for
decision. The Court observes that the ICTY has indeed not up to the present
been directly concerned in final judgments with the question whether those
leaders might bear responsibility in that respect.
ICJ Genocide Judgment, supra note 2, 408.
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testimony.292 Trying to make determinations of credibility in the
absence of the witness is a speculative task that, when attempted
with respect to core issues of a case, strains our conceptions of
what judges can appropriately do when adjudicating such cases.
Can the ICJ's failure to comprehensively review the Milo~evie
evidence be traced to the ICJ's recognition that the task was im-
possible? The ICJ was ill equipped to engage in the type of in-
depth inquiry that a criminal court engages in routinely. Since
none of the witnesses were being heard live, there was no oppor-
tunity for the ICJ to pose questions to the witnesses directly. For
these and other reasons, it seems that the factual issues were
more apt to be properly explored and more soundly adjudicated
in the setting of an international criminal trial. The ICJ risked
the delegitimizing effect of issuing a judgment under its pro-
ceedings that would potentially be undermined by the more
comprehensive exploration of the same issues by an interna-
tional criminal trial. In sum, while the ICJ can build upon the
work of international criminal tribunals, it is unlikely that the
ICJ can satisfactorily adjudicate such difficult issues indepen-
dently.
CONCLUSION
The ICJ-in making its determination that a state, as a state,
could perpetrate the crime of genocide, and in recognizing that
a state's capacity to form genocidal intent exists only in the
minds of senior officials capable of attaching state liability-
committed itself to engaging in an inquiry traditionally reserved
for international criminal tribunals. The ICJ adopted a standard
of proof equivalent to a criminal trial and placed upon the appli-
cant essentially the same burden of proof as borne by an interna-
tional prosecutor. In so doing, the ICJ aligned its work closely to
that of international criminal tribunals. While the ICJ did not
specifically undertake the task of adjudicating individual guilt, its
final determination with respect to state criminal responsibility
for genocide required that it adjudicate core issues of individual
criminal responsibility identical to those faced by an interna-
292. "The Rules do not convey with any precision what system should be applied
for the examination of witnesses and experts, nor do they contain anything on the
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tional criminal tribunal sitting in judgment of a senior state offi-
cial.
The ICJ's methodology, as set out in its Statute, was de-
signed to resolve interstate disputes and remains ill suited to ex-
plore issues of individual criminal culpability. Making final de-
terminations regarding the states of mind of senior state officials
without giving those persons the right to participate in the pro-
ceedings, to question the evidence against them, or to provide a
defense to the allegations raises troubling questions with regard
to both the accuracy of the result and the procedural fairness of
the process. The ICJ's reliance on the ICTY's work in adjudicat-
ing individual criminal responsibility is evidence of its recogni-
tion that international criminal tribunals are better suited to this
task. The ICJ's failure to comprehensively review the body of
evidence presented during the prosecution case against
Milogevi-and which the trial chamber determined could sup-
port a conviction of Milogevie for genocide-demonstrates the
impossibility of its conducting its own review and evaluation of
such a large body of evidence.
Absent a relevant body ofjurisprudence generated by an in-
ternational criminal tribunal or court engaged in a parallel in-
quiry into individual responsibility for genocide, the ICJ is una-
ble to conduct its own independent inquiry into state criminal
responsibility. In the ICJ Genocide Judgment-its first judgement
enforcing the 1948 Genocide Convention-the ICJ has thus cre-
ated, in effect, a relationship of dependency upon the work of
other international criminal courts. Given the likelihood that
future allegations of genocide will be brought not only before
the ICJ, but the ICC, the relationship between the ICJ and the
ICTY as defined by the ICJ Genocide Judgment will also, no doubt,
come to define the relationship between the ICJ and the ICC.
We may expect a State Party to initiate a claim of genocide in the
ICJ shortly after any such alleged conduct takes place and long
before any final determination of individual criminal responsi-
bility in an international criminal tribunal. The ICJ-dependent
upon the work of other tribunals-will necessarily have to wait
upon their final judgments.
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